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CHAPTER I. CAPITAL IN U.S. AGRICULTURE 
Capital has played an enormous role in the development of U.S. 
agriculture. This role has never been greater than now as advancing 
technology leads American farming into the twenty-first century. 
The magnitude of capital controlled by today's farmer would boggle 
the mind of his turn-of-the-century counterpart. The modern cornbelt 
farm may employ $50,000 tractors and $100,000 combines to produce 
crops on $3,500 per acre farmland. The total amount of capital 
controlled by this farm operator may well exceed one million dollars. 
The importance of capital to aggregate U.S. agriculture is at once 
evident when one considers that approximately $950 billion of physical 
assets are employed in farming. Furthermore, U.S. agriculture will 
require approximately $37 billion in 1980 just to meet its demand 
for new physical capital assets (20), 
Capital finds several definitions in economic literature. The 
most simple definition is a tool of production. Solow says "the 
proper scope of capital theory is the elucidation of the causes and 
consequences of acts of saving and investment" (31). Spitze (32) 
defines capital as produced goods and services saved from consumption 
and used by the human agent in further production. This definition 
appears consistent with the mainstream of neoclassical economic 
thought. Belshaw (2) views capital as the accumulated stock of 
real wealth, which includes land as well as produced goods. 
Capital will be defined here as the physical, productive assets 
employed in farming plus financial assets held by the farm sector. 
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Five categories comprise the physical forms of capital: land, 
machinery, buildings and improvements, stored crop inventories, and 
livestock inventories. Financial assets are included in the definition 
of capital because they represent credit in reserve (liquidity) to the 
farm firm. Liquidity is a financial tool necessary for the operation 
of the farm business. This treatment of financial assets is consistent 
with the views of Barry and Baker (1). 
Trends in Capital Use 
Many factors have given rise to increased usage of capital in 
U.S. agriculture. Among them are: capital for labor substitution, 
advancing agricultural technology, and farm specialization. 
Table 1 illustrates the declining number of workers employed 
and the concomitant rise in capital used on American farms. Expressed 
in current dollars, the amount of physical capital assets employed 
per worker increased over 10,000 percent from 1870 to 1979 — a real 
increase of 1,785 percent. Even since 1950, this increase has been 
over 1,000 percent — 290 percent in real terms. At the same time, 
labor employed on American farms has dramatically declined. From a 
peak of over 11 million in 1930, the total farm labor force has 
declined over 65 percent to just under 4 million. Just since 1950, 
the farm labor force has dropped over 60 percent. 
The reasons for this clear trend are twofold: the availability 
of new technology applied to agriculture and a declining capital/labor 
price ratio. The farm firm maximizes profits by utilizing new 
capital intensive production techniques which not only increase 
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Table 1. Capital per worker and total employment In U.S. agriculture, 
1870-1979% 
Value of production assets 
per worker 
Current 
dollars 
Constant 1967 
dollars^ 
Total employment 
(1,000) 
1870 $ 1,700 $ 4,474 6,730 
1880 1,600 5,517 8,570 
1890 1,800 6,667 10,170 
1900 2,000 8,000 10,950 
1910 3,700 13,214 11,350 
1920 7,300 12,167 10,680 
1930 5,800 11,600 11,173 
1940 4,800 12,000 10,585 
1950 15,600 21,637 9,926 
1960 22,176 25,001 7,057 
1965 31,606 33,446 5,610 
1970 55,824 48,000 4,523 
1971 58,626 48,331 4,437 
1972 64,381 51,381 4,373 
1973 73,508 55,228 4,337 
1974 90,648 61,373 4,389 
1975 96,548 59,893 4,342 
1976 110,877 65,030 4,373 
1977 125,287 69,028 4,155 
1978 143,043 73,168 3,937 
1979 174,286 84,318 na 
^Source: 1870-1950 value of production assets per worker (34), 
1870-1930 total employment (45) , 1950-1979 value of production assets 
per worker (42), 1930-1979 total employment (38). 
Total employment = family and hired workers. 
^CPI deflators obtained from (34). 
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output but also prove less costly than hiring additional labor. As a 
result, U.S. agriculture displays a strong and continuing trend 
toward more capital intensive farms. 
Heady points out that "it is technical change and innovation 
which have made available new materials of production" ( 9). These 
new inputs are a variety of capital items which are put to use in 
agricultural production. Technology provides new machines and 
techniques which enable farms to increase output per unit of input. 
The farm firm Increases its derived demand for capital by using 
these new capital inputs. The trend to greater and greater capital 
usage on U.S. farms Is evident in Table 2. The total value of farm 
production assets increased over 666 percent between 1950 and 1979 — 
an increase of 30 percent in real terms. 
As American farms became larger and more specialized, they used 
more and more capital inputs. Farms Increased in scale as they 
attempted to fully utilize new capital intensive techniques. This 
increase in capitalization and scale has resulted in a nominal 
increase in the value of production assets per farm of over 1,200 
percent between 1950 and 1979 — a real Increase of 355 percent 
(Table 3). 
Today's U.S. farms exhibit no signs of reversing these trends 
to more capital intensive farms. The exodus of farm workers continues, 
new technology stimulates Increased capital Investment, and farms 
keep growing in size. 
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Table 2. "" 'e of physical farm assets in the United States, 1870-
Current dollars Constant 1967 dollars^ 
(millions) 
1870 $ 11,864 $ 31,221 
1880 13,370 46,103 
1890 17,466 64,689 
1900 21,766 87,064 
1910 43,293 154,618 
1920 83,846 139,743 
1930 60,494 120,988 
1940 48,708 115,971 
1950 118,691 164,621 
1960 192,108 216,582 
1965 224,427 237,489 
1970 292,064 251,130 
1971 301,918 249,251 
1972 326,128 260,278 
1973 367,046 275,767 
1974 448,654 303,760 
1975 486,063 301,527 
1976 546,922 320,775 
1977 621,112 342,210 
1978 676,758 346,168 
1979 781,717 378,189 
^Source: 1870-1930, (34), 1940-1979, (20). 
^CPI deflators obtained from (45). 
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Table 3. Value of production assets per farm, 1870-1979^ 
Current dollars Constant 1967 dollars^ 
1870 $ 4,J00 $ 11,842 
1880 3,300 11,379 
1890 3,800 14,074 
1900 3,800 15,200 
1910 6,800 24,286 
1920 13,000 21,667 
1930 9,600 19,200 
1940 7,200 17,142 
1950 20,000 27,739 
1960 41,088 46,322 
1965 57,522 60,870 
1970 86,907 74,727 
1971 91,472 75,410 
1972 100,241 80,000 
1973 114,286 85,865 
1974 141,144 95,561 
1975 153,702 95,348 
1976 176,440 103,484 
1977 203,208 111,960 
1978 223,076 114,105 
1979 261,297 126,413 
^Source: 1870-1950, (34), 1960-1979, (42). 
^CPI deflators obtained from (45). 
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Trends in Credit Use 
In an exhaustive study of capital in U.S. agriculture from 1870 
to 1950, Alvin Tostlebe (34) concluded that external (debt) financing 
played a relatively minor role in the financing of net capital growth 
in agriculture — a major exception being the period, 1910-1920. 
Farmers tended to invest only what saving from net income would allow. 
Such has not been the case since World War II. Hathaway (8) states 
that perhaps the most notable feature of the postwar period has been 
the importance of external capital sources to the growth in agri­
cultural investment. Brake (3) argues that as capital demands have 
risen, credit has become relatively more important as a source of 
capital because it represents a residual need for capital beyond that 
available from cash flow. 
The analytical ratios in Table 4 depict the trend to greater 
dependence upon debt financing. Column 8 displays the rising demand 
for capital inputs relative to farm cash flow. The ratio (total 
capital flow)/(farm cash flow) has risen from a low of 35.9 percent 
in 1956 to 67.4 percent in 1979. Savings from income flows have 
declined in importance as a source of capital financing. Farmers 
saved 35.7 percent of farm cash flow to commit to capital financing 
in 1950 while only 29.0 percent in 1979 (column 7). Another measure 
of the strength of internal financing is the percentage of total 
capital flow which is financed by savings from income flow (column 9). 
This percentage stood in the upper 80's in the early 1950s and has 
Table 4. Capital flows and their financing, 1950-1979^ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Farm Net Increase 
capital Capital cash farm Internal in 
flow formation flow income financing debt 
(Current dollars in millions) 
1950 7,762 5,458 17,546 13,648 6,256 1,506 
1951 8,915 6,464 20,449 15,934 7,098 1,817 
1952 7,842 5,441 19,708 14,961 6,982 860 
1953 6,366 4,195 17,648 12,980 6,738 -372 
1954 7,188 4,892 17,113 12,373 6,290 898 
1955 7,199 4,610 16,062 11,305 5,718 1,481 
1956 5,773 3,118 16,086 11,254 4,914 859 
1957 7,584 4,723 16,027 11,085 6,169 1,415 
1958 8,956 5,875 18,340 13,168 6,976 1,980 
1959 6,930 3,765 16,041 10,713 4,496 2,434 
1960 7,468 4,401 16,979 11,518 6,289 1,179 
1961 8,144 4,880 17,691 11,957 6,333 1,810 
1962 9,309 5,955 18,061 12,064 6,577 2,732 
1963 9,539 5,904 18,089 11,770 6,410 3,128 
1964 9,064 5,202 17,050 10,492 6,264 2,800 
1965 11,723 7,412 19,896 12,899 7,734 3,989 
1966 11,442 6,796 21,367 13,960 7,821 3,621 
1967 12,998 8,549 20,002 12,339 9,893 3,106 
1968 11,677 7,369 20,521 12,322 9,868 1,808 
1969 11,685 7,359 22,928 14,293 9,120 2,566 
1970 11,803 7,682 23,043 14,151 9,545 2,257 
1971 15,261 9,559 24,229 14,633 11,017 4,244 
1972 18,226 10,094 30,043 18,665 11,526 6,700 
1973 25,784 15,143 47,973 33,349 15,949 9,835 
1974 19,923 11,327 41,793 26,130 11,796 8,127 
1975 26,244 17,378 41,661 24,475 17,284 8,960 
1976 23,840 12,965 36,715 18,682 12,694 11,146 
1977 28,032 17,586 38,973 19,759 14,869 13,163 
1978 31,356 20,024 49,241 27,880 13,910 17,446 
1979 37,028 24,330 54,900 31,000 15,896 21,132 
^Source: (20). 
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(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
% total 
capital flow 
(5)/(3) (l)/(3) internally (6)/(2) (6)/(4) (6)/(3) 
(%) (%) fin. (%) (%) (%) 
35.7 44.2 80.6 27.6 11.0 8.6 
34.7 43.6 79.6 28.1 11.4 8.9 
35.4 39.8 89.0 15.8 5.7 4.4 
38.2 36.1 105.9 -8.9 -2.9 -2.1 
36.8 42.0 87.5 18.4 7.3 5.2 
35.6 44.8 79.4 32.1 13.1 9.2 
30.6 35.9 85.1 27.5 7.6 5.3 
38.5 47.3 81.3 30.0 12.8 8.8 
38,0 48.8 77.9 33.7 15.0 10.8 
28.0 43.2 64.9 64.6 22.7 15.2 
37.0 44.0 84.2 26.8 10.2 6.9 
35.8 46.0 77.8 37.1 15.1 10.2 
36.4 51.5 70.7 45.9 22.6 15.1 
35.4 52.7 67.2 53.0 26.6 17.3 
36.7 53.2 69.1 34.1 26.7 16.4 
38.9 58.9 66.0 53,8 30.9 20.0 
36.6 53.6 68.3 53.3 25.9 16.9 
49.5 65.0 76.1 36.3 25.2 15.5 
48,1 56.9 84.5 24.5 14.7 9.3 
39.8 51.0 78.0 34.9 18.0 11.2 
41,4 51.2 80.9 29.4 15.9 9.8 
45,5 63.0 72.2 44.4 29.0 17.5 
38.4 60.7 63.2 66.4 35.9 22.3 
33.2 53.7 61.9 64.9 29.5 20.5 
28.2 47.7 59.2 71.7 31.1 19.4 
41,5 63.0 65.9 51.6 36.6 21.5 
34.6 64.9 53.2 85.9 60.0 30.3 
38.2 71,9 53.0 74.8 66 .6 33.8 
28.2 63.7 44.4 87.3 62.6 35.4 
29.0 67.4 42.9 86.9 68.2 38.5 
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dropped in half to 42.9 percent in 1979. Hence, debt financing has 
been growing in significance as a source of net capital growth. 
Melichar (16) states that increased debt financing may not be 
dangerous for agriculture if it is financing increased capital 
formation rather than simply replacing internal sources of funds. 
(Capital formation (column 2) includes expenditures for machinery, 
buildings and land improvements, net change in financial assets, 
and net change in stored crop and livestock inventories.) However, 
the data indicate that external debt financing is increasing faster 
than capital formation (Figure 1). Internal financing is thus being 
replaced by external financing as the ratio in Figure 2 indicates. 
Melichar further states that if capital flows are increasingly 
financed by borrowing rather than by saving from current income, 
more of the ultimate financing burden is being shifted to future 
income. Figures 3 and 4 show that increases in the ratio of debt 
financing to net income have exceeded previous levels. Thus, total 
outstanding debt appears to be growing at a high rate "relative to 
growth in the income flows from which it must be serviced" (16, p. 401). 
The trend to increased debt financing has accelerated since the 
commodity price boom of 1973. Expectations of future income gains 
resulted in a debt-financed capital spending spree. Debt participated 
in the financing to a degree not seen since WWI. Given this trend, 
Melichar concludes that "apprehension about near-term finances of 
the farming sector appears justified" (18, p. 970). 
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Figure 1. Capital formation (X) and debt financing (Y) in U.S, 
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Source: (20). 
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debt (Z), 1950-1980 
Source: (20). 
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Increasing debt financing of capital investment carries several 
Important Implications for U.S. agriculture. The trends noted above 
raise questions about the ability of the farm sector to finance 
itself. U.S. agriculture may be vulnerable to downward farm price 
pressures by overextending its repayment capacity. This could result 
in sizable numbers of loan defaults. The general topic of rural 
financial intermediation has taken on more importance than ever. 
The ability of the rural financial system to supply the farm sector's 
demand for credit has called into question the basic structure of 
rural banking and the farm credit system. 
Hathaway observes that "if capital formation has become dependent 
upon external financing, then the total productivity of the industry 
is related to conditions under which it can obtain credit" (8, p. 82). 
As the farm sector seeks further sources of credit from the non-
agricultural economy, agriculture will be increasingly subject to the 
effects of general monetary policy upon financial conditions. Evidence 
of this surfaced in the spring of 1980 when a tight monetary policy 
by the Federal Reserve System resulted in unprecedented interest rates 
throughout the farm sector. The result of increasing credit use from 
nonagricultural sources is an "increasing interest by farm lenders, 
policy makers, and financial institutions serving agriculture in 
monetary policy and the provision of credit to the agricultural 
economy" (8, p. 84). 
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Projecting Capital Flows 
As the role of capital in U.S. agriculture has increased, agri­
cultural economists have developed techniques to project future 
capital and credit requirements. Studies which determined capital 
needs at the farm unit level have dealt, for the most part, with the 
level of capital assets required. Aggregate research on the other 
hand has emphasized the flow-of-funds (FOF) needed to meet capital 
growth rather than stocks of assets. The importance of FOF analysis 
has been expressed by Ritter (28) as follows; "flow-of-funds accounts 
are as indispensable for understanding developments and interrelation­
ships in financial markets as the national income accounts are for 
understanding trends in production and real output." The purpose 
of FOF analysis in a national economic model is to relate changes in 
balance sheet accounts with income accounts. 
Penson, Lins, and Irwin (22) began a USDA project in 1971 whose 
objective was to develop a farm sector FOF account consistent with 
published farm income and balance sheet accounts. Brake (4) used 
FOF concepts and internal vs. external financing in projecting 
increases in farm debt to 1980. His estimates were partially sub­
jective and did not employ a statistical model. 
Melichar and Doll (19; developed a more rigorous model based 
upon FOF concepts for projecting increases in debt. They estimated 
capital formation by using independent forecasts. An assumed savings 
ratio multiplied by estimated farm cash flow yielded internal 
financing. 
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Melichar (17) extended this methodology in 1973 to develop 
projections of capital demands and credit requirements in 1980. His 
technique became a benchmark for capital flow projections. Structural 
equations estimated the capital flow for six agricultural uses: real 
estate, machinery, livestock inventories, stored crop inventories, 
financial assets, and buildings and land improvements. Melichar 
departed from conventional thinking in estimating real estate capital 
flow. He argued that "it is the amount of funds withdrawn from the 
farming sector by sellers who leave the farming sector or who are 
nonfarm heirs" (17, p. 314). Total net farm income equalled the 
product of estimated per farm net income and projected farm numbers. 
Internal financing was obtained by multiplying an estimated savings 
rate times farm cash flow (net farm income + estimated depreciation). 
Credit requirements were the residual of total capital flow (the 
sum of all six uses) less internal financing. Melichar's entire 
analysis was undertaken independent of a national econometric model 
of the farming sector. 
The work of Penson and Lins led to the development of the 
Aggregative Income and Wealth (AIW) simulator (39). Lins (15) 
concentrated upon disaggregated sources of capital funds in a 
simulation model of rural financial markets. Penson (21) developed 
a model which traced the simultaneous demand for capital uses. The 
AIW simulator combined these elements and, along with subsequent 
revisions, is used by the USDÀ in making capital and credit outlook 
projections. The AIW simulator traces capital flows in the farm 
18 
sector in considerable, disaggregated detail. However, the simulator 
has not been linked to a national econometric model of U.S. agriculture. 
19 
CHAPTER II. OBJECTIVES AND PROJECT SYNOPSIS 
Obj actives 
This research project has one primary objective: to construct 
within the confines of a national econometric model a finance sector 
which can simulate and project capital flow demands and credit 
requirements in U.S. agriculture. A methodological as well as an 
empirical purpose will be served. Past efforts to project capital 
and credit requirements have not been linked with a national economic 
model. Capital flows will be more accurately predicted and causal 
linkages will be more firmly established to the extent that one is 
able to model such flows in conjunction with production patterns. 
By linking with a national model, this project hopes to provide a 
more rigorous framework for analyzing uses of capital in U.S. agri­
culture. 
Empirical projections of farm sector capital and credit require­
ments occur periodically in the literature. This project will continue 
this ongoing cycle of estimates. Capital flow demands and credit 
requirements will be projected over the period, 1980-2000. These 
results will be useful to several groups. Empirical projections 
will help the banking community and farm credit system evaluate their 
ability to service the farm sector. The simultaneous impact of policy 
instruments and economic conditions upon production levels and capital 
demands will provide new and added information to legislators and 
policy makers. 
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Projecting capital flows by means of a finance sector within 
the framework of a production-oriented national simulation model 
permits policy and economic analysis in two directions. First, one 
may examine the effects of policies and economic conditions upon 
capital flows via their impact upon agricultural production. Three 
production impacts will be studied; (1) the level of agricultural 
crop exports, (2) the level of crop price supports, and (3) the trend 
of energy prices. Second, one may analyze the effects of financial 
parameters upon production levels and patterns (as well as the impact 
upon capital flows). Three financial parameters will be considered: 
(1) the savings ratio (internal financing/net farm income), (2) the 
rate of inflation, and (3) restrictive ceilings on the level of agri­
cultural lending. Specific model alternatives are discussed later 
in this chapter. 
Project Synopsis 
Simulation model 
A sequential national econometric simulation model maintained 
by the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) serves 
as the base model. Original documentation for thJ,3 model is found 
in Ray (23) and Ray and Heady (24). Refinements and revisions of 
this original model are reported in Reynolds, Heady, and Mitchell 
(27). Roberts and Heady (29) developed an endogenous livestock 
sector to extend the model. The latest version of the model which 
is used in this project is documented in English et al. (7). An overview 
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of the CARD simulation model appears in Reynolds e^ a^. (27, pp. 4-11). 
The main features of this model are repeated here. 
The CARD model depicts the agricultural production cycle by the 
sequential manner in which equations are solved. The current values 
of dependent variables are determined from combinations of past and 
current values of variables previously determined. The path of 
endogenous variables over time may be specified by iterating the 
model one year at a time. The effects of alternative policy and 
economic environments may be compared by choosing distinct sets of 
exogenous variables. 
The sequential nature of the model permits a consecutive ordering 
of the agricultural production cycle. Three phases are distinguished: 
planning, planting, and harvesting. These phases correspond to the 
pre-input, input, and output sections of the model. The pre-input 
section contains equations which determine the levels of fixed 
resources: acreage to be harvested, ending calendar year stocks of 
machinery and commodities, value of land and buildings, and total 
physical assets. The input section uses results from the pre-input 
section along with other data to determine input demands. Factors 
of production which are estimated include the following: fertilizer 
and lime, seed, labor, machinery operating expenses, real estate 
expenses and taxes, and interest on commodity stocks. Finally, the 
output section uses input from the previous two sections to set 
production, commodity price, and income values. 
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The model Is disaggregated Into six endogenous subsectors 
representing six major agricultural commodities: feed grains, wheat, 
soybeans, cotton, tobacco, and livestock. Each subsector models 
production at the national level. Other minor commodities are 
included in an exogenous subsector. Production is simulated for each 
of the endogenous commodity subsectors by means of the three sequential 
phases outlined above. A United States aggregate output sector is 
obtained by summing across the six endogenous and one exogenous 
subsectors. 
Finance sector 
The conceptual framework of the finance sector will closely 
follow the methodology of Melichar (17). This approach has been 
selected for three principal reasons. First, emphasis will be on 
aggregate capital uses and thus the highly disaggregated framework 
of Penson (21) is less appropriate. Second, Melichar's techniques 
are considered by many researchers to be the benchmark tools for 
projecting capital and credit requirements. Finally, this approach 
is most amenable to linking a finance sector with the CARD simulation 
model. 
Analysis will focus upon the uses of capital flows. Sources 
of funds will be considered only to the extent that a dichotomy 
between internal and external financing is recognized. For each of 
the endogenous subsectors, annual capital flow demands are estimated 
in five categories as follows : 
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(1) Land Capital Flow = (Land Price) * (Real Stock) * 
(Percent Transferred by Discontinuing Proprieters) 
(2) Machinery Capital Flow = Depreciation + Machinery Purchases 
(3) Livestock Capital Flow = (Increase in Real Stock) * (Price) 
(livestock subsector only) 
(4) Stored Crop Capital Flow = (Increase in Real Stock) * (Price) 
(all except livestock sector) 
(5) Building and Improvement Capital Flow = (Increase in Real 
Stock) * (Price). 
In the aggregate finance sector, one further category is estimated: 
(6) Financial Assets Capital Flow = Increase in Stocks of 
Currency, Time Deposits, Demand Deposits, U.S. Savings 
Bonds, and Investments in Cooperatives. 
Summing categories (1) through (5) will give the total capital flow 
for one commodity subsector. Summing this quantity across all six 
commodity subsectors yields total production capital flow. Adding 
the financial assets capital flow (category (6)) and the exogenous 
subsector capital flow equals total annual capital flow for the 
United States. 
U.S. net farm income may be derived from the output section of 
the model as follows: 
(7) Net Farm Income = Gross Farm Income - Current Farm Expenses. 
Given net farm income, internal financing of total capital flow may be 
estimated as: 
(8) Internal Financing = (Savings Ratio) * (Net Farm Income), 
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The savings ratio is exogenously set according to its historical trend. 
Finally, external financing (credit requirements or increase in debt) 
is the residual financing of total capital flow. 
(9) External Financing = Total Capital Flow - Internal Financing 
Policy and Economic Alternatives 
The simulation model is run under a number of alternative economic 
and policy environments. This provides an empirical comparison of 
future capital flows and credit requirements for different farm 
sector economic scenarios. A base projection furnishes the standard 
of comparison for the various policy and economic shocks. The base 
Includes an inflation rate of 5.75 percent, no commodity price 
supports, expected trend crop exports, and an increasing diesel 
price trend of 0.5f per year in real terms. 
Crop exports 
Two projections are made under alternative crop export levels 
than the base. Alternative I contains an export trend at levels 
one-half of those in the base. Alternative II projects capital flows 
with crop exports at one and one-half times the base trend. These 
three levels of exports are compared in Table 5. 
Crop price supports 
The base projection contains no price supports. Two additional 
projections are made with 75 percent and 90 percent parity price 
supports. Parity prices are those as of August, 1980 (44). Prices 
are supported for the five major crops (Table 6) . Support prices are 
Table 5. Alternative crop export levels 
(million tons) (million bushels) 
1980 67.47 65,84 69.10 1,229.3 1,204.2 1,254.3 
1990 78.36 71.28 85.43 1,401.3 1,292.6 1,510.0 
2000 89.24 76.72 101.76 1,568.5 1,376.2 1,760.8 
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Soybeans Cotton lint Tobacco 
1/2 3/2 1/2 3/2 1/2 3/2 
Base trend trend Base trend trend Base trend trend 
(million bushels) 
788.3 756.5 820.1 
1,000.5 862.6 1,138.4 
1,212.7 968.7 1,456.7 
(million bales) 
4.76 3.57 5.95 
4.76 3.57 5.95 
4.76 3.57 5.95 
(million pounds) 
684.9 671.4 704.3 
740.3 715.4 787.4 
790.5 743.1 870.5 
Table 6. Alternative crop support prices' 
Feed grains 
Base 75% 90% 
1980 82,30 
($ per ton) 
109.58 131.50 
Wheat 
Base 75% 90% 
($ per bushel) 
2.43 4.45 5.35 
1990 65.73 112.35 134.82 1.97 4.57 5.49 
2000 63.31 115.19 138.23 1.85 4.68 5.63 
^All prices expressed in 1978 dollars. 
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Soybeans Cotton lint Tobacco 
Base 75% 90% Base 75% 90% Base 75% 90% 
($ per bushel) (0 per lb.) (<? per lb.) 
8.08 8.08 9.34 58.91 73.71 88.45 129.36 155.46 186.55 
7.27 10.47 11.22 53.84 75.57 90.69 128.04 159.39 191.27 
7.72 12.20 13.61 57.04 77.48 92.98 127.76 163.42 196.10 
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assumed to Increase at the same 6 percent rate as the farm prices 
paid index. In real terms, when this increase is deflated by the 
5.75 percent rise in the GNP deflator, support prices rise at the 
rate of 0.25 percent per year. 
Energy prices 
The price of diesel fuel is increased to reflect rising energy 
prices. Two rates of diesel price escalation are considered in 
addition to the base. Under Alternative I, diesel prices rise in 
real terms by If per gallon per year to a level of $1.56 per gallon 
in the year 2000. Real increases of 2<; per gallon per year to a 2000 
level of $1.90 per gallon occur in Alternative II. 
Table 7. Alternative diesel price trends^ 
(Dollars per gallon) 
Year Base Alternative I Alternative II 
1980 $1.03 $1.03 $1.03 
1990 1.13 1.24 1.46 
2000 1.24 1.46 1.90 
^All prices expressed in 1978 dollars. 
Inflation 
The base projection includes a 5.75 percent inflation rate. The 
effects upon capital flows of three other rates of inflation are 
considered: 4 percent, 10 percent, and 12 percent. 
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Savings ratio 
An important parameter which influences credit requirements is 
the savings ratio. The savings ratio is defined as that portion of 
net farm income which is committed to internal financing of net 
capital investment. In addition to the base rate of 0.61, the impact 
upon debt financing of the following savings ratios is considered: 
0.30, 0.45, and 0.75. 
Restrictive ceiling on agricultural credit 
At the outset, it was hoped that interest rates could be used as 
explanatory variables for the various capital flows. The effects of 
restrictive monetary policy could then be demonstrated by exogenously 
raising interest rates. However, interest rates were not significant 
as explanatory variables. This happened because the model uses annual 
data plus the fact that interest rates were so stable for many years. 
An alternative method for demonstrating the results of tight monetary 
policy is to place a restrictive ceiling on agricultural lending. The 
amount of credit required in the base projection is restricted first 
to a 70 percent and then a 50 percent level to analyze the effects of 
tight money upon capital demands and farm sector Income. 
31 
CHAPTER III. FINANCE SECTOR STRUCTURE 
AND ESTIMATION 
Several structural equations are necessary to complete the finance 
sector. For each of the six commodity subsectors the following equa­
tions will be required: 
(1) Price of land 
(2) Machinery purchases 
(3) End-of-year commodity stocks 
(4) Building and land improvement expenditures. 
One further structural equation is needed in the aggregate finance 
sector: 
(5) Additions to financial assets. 
Some of the necessary equations already exist in the CARD simulation 
model. Many of these have been reestimated to improve them and 
include additional financial explanatory variables where appropriate. 
Newly estimated as well as reestimated equations are outlined below. 
Data 
Annual time series data are used to estimate structural equa­
tions. The estimation period covers 28 years of data from 1949 to 
1976. Data were gathered from a variety of sources and all essential 
data used are documented below. Data sources for the CARD simulation 
model are contained in Appendix A of Schatzer et al^. (30). 
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Value of land and buildings 
A constant dollar value of production series was formed for each 
commodity by multiplying a USDA (40) commodity production index times 
the 1967 value of production for the respective commodity. A time 
series of each commodity's proportion of total production was obtained 
by dividing each year's value of production by U.S. total production. 
A total value of land and buildings data series was obtained from 
Melichar and Waldheger (20). This deflated total series was then 
disaggregated among commodities by multiplying it by the proportion 
of U.S. production for each respective commodity. 
Machinery purchases 
Current dollar machinery purchases ( 41) were allocated to separate 
commodities by the share of annual machinery depreciation. Constant 
dollar machinery purchases were found by deflating the motor vehicle 
component of machinery purchases by the index of motor vehicle prices, 
1967 = 100 (35, 36) and the "other" machinery category by the index 
of machinery prices, 1967 = 100. The index of motor vehicle prices 
and the index of machinery prices were discontinued after 1974. 
These two indexes were thereafter estimated by regressing them on 
the index of tractor and self-propelled machinery prices, 1967 = 100 
( 37) . The motor supply price index used as an explanatory variable 
in machinery purchase equations has been developed by Christenson 
et a^. (5). 
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Financial data 
A variety of financial data was necessary for estimating structural 
equations. These include the following: U.S. net farm income, dis­
aggregated capital flows, internal and external financing of capital 
flows, total outstanding farm debt, and financial assets. These data 
were all obtained from Melichar and Waldheger (20). 
Statistical Procedures 
The sequential nature of the simulation model allows structural 
equations to be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). This 
simplifies estimation considerably over simultaneous techniques. 
An assumption necessary for OLS estimation is that the error terms 
between observations be independent. If error terms are correlated, 
the OLS estimators are not efficient and hence are not best linear 
unbiased estimators. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic was used as a first indicator of 
autocorrelation. If the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated significant 
autocorrelation, then autoregressive least squares (ALS) estimation 
was applied. Plots of the OLS residuals over time were also examined 
to determine the presence of autocorrelation. If an equation contains 
a lagged dependent variable, the Durbin-Watson statistic becomes 
inappropriate because it is biased toward indicating no autocorrelation 
(33, p. 414). In this case, ALS was used and the test for autocorrela­
tion outlined below was applied. 
The SAS autoregressive least squares estimation technique was 
applied to all equations with suspected autocorrelated error terms. 
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The estimated autoregressive parameter, p, was tested for significance 
at the 5 percent level. When'p was not significant, the OLS equation 
was accepted. If "p was significant, the ALS equation was included in 
the model. 
Structural Equations 
Structural equations which have been implemented in the finance 
sector are presented and discussed below. Statistics accompanying 
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each equation are: R , mean square error (MSB), and Durbin-Watson 
statistic (DW). Beneath each estimated independent variable coefficient 
is the corresponding t statistic. Next to each t statistic is a 
symbol denoting the level of significance: * = 1 percent, ** = 5 
percent, *** = 10 percent. Finally, the statistical technique (OLS 
or ALS) used for each equation is listed. 
Land price equations 
Melichar (17) notes that a large number of possible explanatory 
variables are highly correlated with agricultural land prices in the 
postwar period. Reinsel (25) adds that what usually passes for great 
success in statistical estimation is readily achieved with little 
assurance that any real knowledge has been gained. Melichar (20) 
estimated land prices as a function of (1) the general price index, 
(2) number of farms, and (3) an index of crop production per acre. 
He found the expected positive sign for each of these explanatory 
variables. 
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Land prices have been estimated here in real terms (1967 dollars). 
As discussed earlier, a value of land and building index was dis­
aggregated into six separate indexes corresponding to the six major 
commodity subsectors. Each commodity land value index was regressed 
on a number of possible explanatory variables. 
Two variables, value of crop production and U.S. farm size, 
furnished the most economic information on land price variation as 
well as the best fit equations. Lagged value of production per 
harvested acre carries the expected positive sign for the five crop 
commodities (Equations 1-5). This means that land price is positively 
correlated with per acre income — an expected result from theory. 
The livestock value of land equation (6) contains lagged real gross 
income instead of value of production per acre. The sign on farm 
size is, as expected, positive in all six equations. This variable 
measures the pace of farm enlargement activity — the so-called "add­
on" market. The positive sign for this coefficient is consistent 
with the work of Heady and Tweeten (11), Reynolds and Timmons (26), 
and Klinefeltner (13). In the tobacco land price equation, a time 
variable captures the same farm enlargement effect as the farm size 
variable in the other equations. 
(1) Feed Grain Price of Land 
FG - PRLA = -0.694265 + 0.004135*FMSIZE 
(14.85)* 
+ 0.002212*(FG-VALPROD/FG-HAC) 
(3.02)* 
OLS R^ = .9466 MSE = .004530 DW = 1.5224 
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(2) Wheat Price of Land 
W-PRLA = -0.448173 + 0.003979*FMSIZE 
^ (15.91)* ^ 
+ 0.003004*(W-VALPROD/W-HAC)^ i 
(2.72)* t-1 
OLS R^ = .9196 MSE = .005439 DW = 1.8399 
(3) Soybean Price of Land 
SB-PRLA = -0.701388 + 0.004569*FMSIZE 
t (20.49)* ^ 
+ 0.001114*(SB-VALPROD/SB-HAC) 
(1.31)*** 
OLS R^ = .9536 MSE = .003911 DW = 1.0550 
(4) Cotton Price of Land 
CT-PRLA = -0.447195 + 0.002549*FMSIZE + 0.002056* 
^ (3.49)* ^ (3.17)* 
(CT-VALPROD/CT-HAC) , + 0.300548*CT-PRLA^ ^ 
(1.64)** 
OLS R^ = .9089 MSE = .004376 DW = 2.3808 
(5) Tobacco Price of Land 
TB-PRLA = 0.228627 + 0.016805*TIME + 0.000288* 
t (1.93)** (4.61)* 
(TB-VALPROD/TB-HAC) 
OLS R^ = .9059 MSE = .003874 DW = 1.6530 
(6) Livestock Value of Land 
LV-VALA = -9923.43 + 82.613805*FMSIZE^ + 0.909527* 
t (1.65)** t 
LV-RGINC , + 0.540735*LV-VALA^ -
t-1 (2.67)* t-1 
OLS R^ = .9472 MSE = 1,353,9074 DW = 1.9612 
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Where : 
FG = Feed grain CT = Cotton 
W = Wheat TB = Tobacco 
SB = Soybean LV = Livestock 
PRLA^ = Real price of land in year t ; 
FMSIZE^ = U.S. average farm size in year t; 
VALPROD^ = Value of production in year t; 
HAC^ = Harvested acreage in year t; 
TIME = Continuous time variable; 
VALA^ = Value of land in year t; 
RGINC^ = Real gross income in year t. 
The soybean land price equation provided the most difficult 
estimation. The lagged value of production coefficient is significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Other income proxy variables did not 
offer better results. Since the value of production variable appears 
in all other cropland price equations, it is included in the soybean 
equation. The DW statistic is very low for the soybean equation — 
indicating autocorrelated errors. When ALS was run, "p proved significant 
only at the 10 percent level. Therefore, the OLS equation is used. 
Aggregate land capital flow 
In the aggregate finance sector, the total value of land and 
buildings is obtained by summing across the six endogenous commodity 
subsectors and the one exogenous subsector. The value of land alone 
is disaggregated by multiplying the total value by the ratio. 
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(land value/total land + building value). This ratio is formed by 
examining historical data from Farm Real Estate Market Development (43) . 
This land ratio series was fit with respect to time. Equation 7 
establishes the percentage of total land and buildings value which 
is land only. 
(7) Disaggregation of Land Value 
US-PCTLAND = ,70729 + 0.004415*TIME 
(16.80)* 
ALS = .9097 MSE = 0.00001 p = -0.8248 
(-7.99)* 
Where: 
US = U.S. aggregate sector; 
PCTLAND^ = Percentage of total land + building value which 
is land only in year t. 
As the positive coefficient on TIME indicates, land alone is making up 
an increasingly larger share of the total value of land and buildings 
over time. 
Finally, the annual capital flow for land is computed by multiply­
ing total value of land by the transfer rate (percentage of land sold 
by discontinuing proprietors). This factor is fixed at a level of 
3.2 percent. This was determined by analyzing data obtained from 
Melichar and Waldheger (20). Transfer rate averages over three 
periods were the following: 1950-1979, 3.19 percent; 1950-1969, 
3.20 percent; 1970-1979, 3.18 percent. Given these values, the 3.2 
percent value was selected. 
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Building and land improvement capital flow 
The above procedure provided accurate simulation of the land 
capital flow over the period, 1949-1976. However, the series of 
residual building values (obtained by subtracting land value from 
the total) did not closely fit the historical data. A separate time 
series of annual expenditures for buildings and land improvements 
was obtained from Melichar and Waldheger (20). 
Constant dollar expenditures were fit against possible explanatory 
variables to express building capital flow in terms of financial 
parameters. Equation 8 explains building expenditures in terms of 
U.S. gross farm income, a free market dummy for the years 1974-1976, 
and a lagged dependent variable. 
(8) U.S. Building and Land Improvement Expenditures 
US-BLDG = 479.66969 + 0.015293*US-RGINC 
^ (4.15)* ^ 
+ 459.215707*07476 + 0.383144*US-BLDG 
(3.69)* (3.09)* 
OLS = .9050 MSE = 14,284.39 DW = 1.9180 
Where: 
BLDG^ = U.S. capital expenditures for buildings and land 
improvements in year t; 
D7476 = Free market dummy, 1974-1976 = 1.0. 
Building capital flow is positively related to gross farm income 
as theory would suggest. D7476 carries a positive sign because the 
free market agricultural policies from 1974 to 1976 resulted in 
relatively higher income and building expenditures than the 
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historical trend. Capital expenditures for buildings have steadily 
increased in the postwar period and thus the lagged dependent variable 
has a positive sign. 
Machinery capital flow 
Melichar (17) explains machinery capital flow in terms of 
harvested acreage, the ratio of machinery prices to farm wage rates, 
and farm cash flow, Cromarty (6) estimated demand for farm machinery 
in terms of machinery prices, farm output prices, total farm assets, 
and net farm income. Heady and Tweeten (11) published a set of demand 
functions for machinery, their results indicating that income is a 
major explanation of machinery purchases. 
A constant dollar machinery purchase data series for each 
endogenous commodity is constructed as discussed above. Six structural 
equations (9-14) are fit to explain machinery purchases for the six 
major commodities. Four independent variables explain most of the 
variation. Lagged real gross income and harvested acreage both 
carry positive signs in all of the equations. This is in accord 
with production theory: as output and acreage increase, more 
machinery inputs will be required. The motor supply price index 
and lagged machinery stocks both have negative signs in all equations. 
We expect the substitution effect to reduce machinery purchases when 
machinery or fuel prices increase. Lagged machinery stock has a 
negative coefficient because when stocks are high, capacity for 
machinery services is high. Thus the need for new, additional 
machinery will be low. 
41 
Two dummy variables are included in the machinery purchase 
equations. The feed grain and wheat equations contain D6871, where 
1968-1971 = 1.0. This variable reflects the relatively low farm 
income which resulted from large grain surpluses during these years. 
Similarly, the soybean, tobacco, and livestock equations include 
D6872, where 1968-1972 = 1.0. The sign on these two variables is 
negative to reflect the dampening effect of income on machinery 
purchases over this period. The feed grain equation contains one 
additional dummy variable, D73, where 1973 = 1.0. This variable has 
a positive sign and captures the boost in income and machinery 
expenditures which accompanied the sharp increase in agricultural 
exports in 1973. 
(9) Feed Grain Machinery Purchases 
FG-MPUR. = 1424.9650 + 11.28913*FG-HAC + 0.055075*FG-RGINC _ 
^ (3.18)* ^ (2.77)* ^ ^ 
- 0.103154*FG-MSTK , - 999.666528*MSPI^ + 210.218425* 
(-2.90)* (-1.92)** ^ (2.08)** 
D73 - 180.887585*06871 + 0.500442*FG-MPUR. ^ 
(-2.17)** (4.16)* 
OLS R^ = .8494 MSB = 12,819 DW = 2.0473 
(10) Wheat Machinery Purchases 
W-MPUR = 344.4345 + 7.873254*W-HAC^ + 1.389224*(W-RGINC/W-HAC) ^ 
(7.62)* ^ (2.69)* 
- 476.937407*MSPI - 0.040602*W-MSTK - 64.529134* 
(-7.37)* ^ (-2.93)* (-3.94)* 
D6871 + 0.523131*W-MPUR^ , 
(6.18)* t-1 
OLS = .9633 MSB = 512.98 DW = 2.4075 
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(11) Soybean Machinery Purchases 
SB-MPUR = 817.7390 + 10.457959*SB-HAC + 3.101708* 
^ (6.32)* (3.39)* 
(SB-RGINC/SB-HAC)^ , - 862.979230*(MSPI/GNP) 
(-3.61)* 
- 100.939806*D6872 
(-3.60)* 
OLS = .9717 MSE = 1515.87 DW = 1.1806 
(12) Cotton Machinery Purchases 
CT-MPUR = 125.0877 + 9.667678*CT-HAC - 135.453422* 
^ (9.38)* (-3.21)* 
MSPI + 0.257368*CT-MPUR^ , 
t (3.33)* t-1 
OLS R^ = .9265 MSE = 246.86 DW = 1.6046 
(13) Tobacco Machinery Purchases 
TB-MPUR = 19.9919 + 4.720472*TB-HAC^ - 0.017435*TB-MSTK 
(2.34)* ^ (-2.76)* 
- 14.506862*MSPI - 2.81461*06872 + 0.768157*TB-MPUR 
(-2.76)* ^ (-3.40)* (5.85)* 
OLS R^ = .8830 MSE = 1.37 DW = 1.9741 
(14) Livestock Machinery Purchases 
LV-MPUR = 783.0148 + 0.00508*LV-RGINC , - 0.088337*LV-MSTK . 
t (1.98)** t-1 (_3.88)* 
- 365.354542*MSPI - 51.467559*06872 + 0.533395* 
(-3.95)* (-2.55)* (3.92)* 
LV-MPUR , t-i 
OLS R^ = .7661 MSE = 768.64 DW = 2.0625 
Where: 
MPUR^ = Machinery purchases in year t ; 
RGINC^ = Real gross income in year t; 
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MSTK^ = Machinery stock in year t; 
D73 = 1973 export dummy, 1973 = 1.0; 
MSPI^ = Motor supply price index in year t; 
GNP^ = GNP implicit price deflator for year t; 
D6871 = Dummy variable, 1968-1971 = 1.0; 
D6872 = Dummy variable, 1968-1972 = 1.0. 
Depreciation also contributes to machinery capital flow. A 
depreciation rate of lA.A percent was selected after examining data 
from Melichar and Waldheger (20). This rate is in agreement with 
Melichar (17). The depreciation rate is multiplied by the end of 
year total U.S. machinery stock to yield capital flow necessary to 
finance annual depreciation. Depreciation is added to total machinery 
purchases to give total U.S. machinery capital flow. 
Commodity stock capital flow 
Commodity stock capital flow equals the net annual change in the 
value of commodity inventories. The value of a commodity's current 
end-of-year inventory less the value of last year's closing inventory 
gives the capital flow associated with storing that commodity. The 
sum of this quantity across all six commodity subsectors plus the 
exogenous file yields total U.S. capital flow for commodity stocks. 
The CARD model has structural equations which estimate end-of-
year commodity stocks for the six endogenous subsectors. These 
equations are listed in English ^  al. (7 ). An attempt was made to 
reestimate these equations. However, one defect of the CARD model is 
that end-of-year stocks are determined prior to current year production 
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in sequential order. The "improved" equations all contained current 
year production as an explanatory variable. Since this is inconsistent 
with the sequential algorithm of the present CARD model, the "old" 
equations were kept. Since commodity stock capital flows play a 
relatively insignificant 8 percent share of total capital flow, this 
should not be a serious drawback. 
Financial asset capital flow 
A time series of financial assets held by the farm sector was 
obtained from Melichar and Waldheger (20). Structural Equation 15 
explains the variation in farm held financial assets in terms of time, 
U.S. net farm income, and a lagged dependent variable. Time carries a 
negative coefficient because the level of financial assets held by the 
farm sector has steadily declined in the postwar period. Farmers have 
invested their money in physical capital and increased the leverage 
in their operations. The negative sign on lagged U.S. net farm 
income appears to be inconsistent with theory. However, the data 
suggest that in years following a sharp increase in net farm income, 
capital investment increases markedly as farmers invest in hopes of 
continuing the previous year's high rate of return. This high level 
of capital investment draws down financial assets; hence, the negative 
sign (Figure 5). When income is up, financial asset levels decline. 
(15) U.S. Financial Assets Held by the Farm Sector 
US-FINA = 9806.4780 - 46.484504*TIME 
^  ( 2 . 8 2 ) *  
- 0.131034*US-NINC , + 0.647858*US-FINA^ , 
(-3.48)* t-1 (4.49)* C-1 
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Figure 5. Constant dollar financial assets held by the farm sector 
(X) and constant dollar net farm income (Y), 1950-1980 
Source: (20). 
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OLS = .7450 MSB = 326,767 DW = 1.8715 
Savings ratio 
Internal financing equals the saving ratio times net farm income. 
The savings ratio may be defined in two ways: (1) internal financing/ 
farm cash flow and (2) internal financing/net farm income. Melichar (17) 
employs the first definition. Because the CARD model does not estimate 
the depreciation component of farm cash flow, the second definition is 
employed here. The historical trend of both ratios appears in Figure 6. 
A basic rate of 0.61 has been adopted for the model. This equals the 
1970-1979 as well as the 1960-1979 average value. The impacts of 
alternative savings ratios on credit demands are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
Model Validation 
The accuracy of finance sector projections is checked with a 
historical simulation run for 1949-1976. Actual exogenous data are 
used to estimate endogenous variables. Accuracy is measured by 
comparing actual and predicted values. A Theil inequality coefficient 
is computed for each endogenous variable in the finance sector. The 
Theil coefficient (33) is constructed as follows: 
2 - 1/N E(Aj. - A^_p2 
where: 
A^ = Actual observation in year t; 
= Predicted value in year t; 
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Figure 6. Internal financing/net farm income, (X), and internal 
financing/farm cash flow, (Y), 1950-1980 
Source: (20). 
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= Actual observation in year t-1; 
N = Number of observations. 
The Theil coefficient compares the predictive ability of the model 
with that of naive extrapolation. A Theil coefficient greater than 
one suggests that the naive model predicts better than the model 
being tested. A coefficient less than one indicates the model in 
question predicts better. 
2 Table 8 contains Theil coefficients for land price, machinery 
purchase, commodity stock, financial assets, and building expenditures 
variables in the model. (Theil coefficients for the CARD model are 
contained in Schatzer _et al^. (30).) The values of all Theil coefficients 
except financial assets and livestock inventories are less than one. 
This implies that the finance sector predicts with a fair degree of 
accuracy. The two exceptions, financial assets and livestock inventory, 
are greater than one because yearly variation in the actual data is 
never more than 5 percent. Under this stable trend, the Theil 
coefficient is not a good test of predictive ability. 
Projection Qualifications 
Rapidly changing technology has been one principal reason for 
increasing capital demands and credit requirements in U.S. agriculture. 
A model which is based upon historical data cannot project with 
complete accuracy the rate at which technology and new capital inputs 
will be applied to agriculture. Technology has shown an accelerating 
trend in creating new capital input demands. Hence, historical data 
Table 8. Theil coefficients for finance sector endogenous variables 
Feed 
grains Wheat 
Subsector 
Soybeans Cotton Tobacco Livestock 
U.S. 
aggregate 
Price of land .67 .59 .90 .84 .80 .53 
Machinery 
purchases .23 .28  ,18 .50 .89 .42 
Commodity 
stocks .59 .48 .47 .44 .38 1.01 
Financial 
assets 1.43 
Building 
expenditures .31 
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should understate, if anything, the rate of growth in future capital 
demands. 
At the same time, a model based upon historical data cannot 
predict with perfect accuracy the true effects of future shocks to 
the economic system. For example, when energy prices rise, technology 
will develop which conserves energy and/or substitutes other capital 
inputs for energy. This will mediate the impact of the price rise on 
production, income, and capital demands. The model does not reflect 
this effect and therefore is not completely reliable in analyzing 
exogenous shocks on the U.S. farm sector. 
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CHAPTER IV. CAPITAL FLOW PROJECTIONS 
The CARD simulation model, with complete finance sector outlined 
above, projects capital flows over the period, 1980-2000. Projections 
20 years into the future carry certain limitations. First, the 
confidence interval surrounding future estimates gets much larger as 
one moves out in time. The 2000 estimates should be viewed, there­
fore, as rough estimates and not certain projections. Secondly, the 
model cannot reflect with perfect accuracy how the farm sector will 
respond to various exogenous shocks in the future. Results should 
be examined cognizant of the fact that new technology and other 
developments may dampen future exogenous impacts on capital flows. 
Projections will, nonetheless, provide useful guides to assess farm 
sector capital needs. 
Results are grouped according to economic and policy alterna­
tives. Projections are presented in tabular and graphic form. Dollar 
amounts are expressed in real terms (1978 = 100). Tables will provide 
multi-year averages for six periods: 1980-1981, 1982-1983, 1984-1985, 
1986-1990, 1991-1995, and 1996-2000. Analysis will focus upon a 
few key variables: commodity production, net farm income, capital 
flow demands, and capital financing. 
Comparisons will be drawn between a base projection and a number 
of simulations under alternative economic and policy scenarios. 
The base projection explores the future of U.S. agriculture while 
assuming a continuation of current trends in technology, farm size, 
exports, and resource demands. Commodity supply and demand grow at 
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Table 9. Base projection estimated crop production and capital flows^, 
1980-2000 
1 2 3 4 5 
U.S. production 
Period 
Feed 
grains Wheat Soybeans Cotton Tobacco 
(mil. 
tons) 
(mil. 
bushels) 
(mil. 
bushels) 
(mil. 
bales) 
(mil. 
pounds) 
1980-1981 226.51 2,115.86 1,861.46 14.42 1,997.69 
1982-1983 233.41 2,221.18 1,966.78 14.20 1,988.53 
1984-1985 242.67 2,306.03 2,062.16 14.20 1,974.81 
1986-1990 257.16 2,387.93 2,243.91 14.70 1,942.63 
1991-1995 275.29 2,494.16 2,520.09 15.42 1,884.91 
1996-2000 294.79 2,617.10 2,804.79 15.98 1,814.07 
^Expressed in 1978 dollars. 
53 
Table 9. Continued 
6 7 8 9 10 11 
U.S. farm capital flows 
Bldg. Lvst. 
Real Financial and Machi- Stored inven-
Period estate assets imp. nery crops tories 
(million dollars) 
1980-•1981 13,338.2 -614.5 5,460.8 16,039 .5 396.9 1,150.8 
1982-•1983 13,878.3 -522.8 5,537.7 16,014 .6 —48.4 531,7 
1984-•1985 14,318.8 -259.7 5,574.9 16,186 .7 141.2 329.5 
1986-•1990 15,074.0 -986.3 5,641.1 16,224 .1 209.9 330.1 
1991-•1995 16,274.5 -1,295.7 5,844.0 16,285 .9 113.5 351.6 
1996-•2000 17,673.8 -2,639.0 6,129.1 16,581 .9 59.9 336.8 
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Table 9. Continued 
12 U 14 15 16 
U.S. farm capital flows 
Total 
Total Increase U.S. net farm debt 
capital Internal in farm outstand-
Period flow finance debt income ing 
(million dollars) 
1980-•1981 35,771. 7 19,179 .2 16,592 . 6 31,441.2 176,181 
1982-•1983 35,391. 1 18,911 .9 16,479 .3 31,003.1 208,648 
1984-•1985 36,291. 3 18,100 .3 18,191 .0 29,672.7 244,097 
1986-•1990 37,357. 9 17,234 .1 20,123 .9 28,252.5 357,310 
1991-•1995 38,474. 2 18,765 .5 19,708 .7 30,763.1 413,635 
1996-•2000 40,209. 3 21,578 .1 18,631 .2 35,374.0 508,844 
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historical trends. Current U.S. farm policy is embodied in this 
"trend" future simulation. The base projection is outlined below 
because it will be a standard for comparison. 
Base Projection 
Rising export and commercial domestic demand result in increased 
crop production over the projection period. Average production in 
1996-2000 is higher than 1980-1981 by 30 percent for feed grains, 
24 percent for wheat, 50 percent for soybeans, and 10 percent for 
cotton (Table 9). Demand increases slightly more rapidly than supply, 
pushing up net farm income 12 percent to an average amount of $35.4 
billion in 1996-2000. Per farm net income jumps nearly 50 percent 
from 1980 to a 1996-2000 average of $17,500 as the number of farms 
drops from 2.60 million in 1950 to 2.09 million in 2000. 
Capital flow demands increase with rising crop production and 
net income. Total capital flow averages $40.2 billion over 1996-2000 — 
12 percent higher than the 1980-1981 average of $35.8 billion. Most of 
this increase comes in the form of real estate. While financial asset, 
livestock, and stored crop capital flows actually decline over the 
20-year period, real estate capital flow increases by 32 percent in 
real terms. Real land prices increase sharply (approximately 25 
percent) as farm receipts per acre rise (with growing commodity 
demand), and the average U.S. farm expands in size by 17 percent. 
Machinery capital flow increases only 3 percent from the 1980-1981 
to the 1996-2000 average. While commodity production does increase, 
increasing yields play a greater part in this than growth in acreage 
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harvested. Machinery stocks, therefore, remain relatively constant 
as machinery purchases increase only marginally. 
Internal financing increases by the same 12 percent as U.S. net 
farm income. Internal sources account for $21.6 billion, or a 54 
percent share of total capital flow in 1996-2000. Annual debt 
financing increases by 12 percent from the 1980-1981 level to a 
1996-2000 average of $18.6 billion (Table 9). The real stock of 
physical assets grows at an average annual rate of 1.1 percent to a 
2000 level of $745 billion. To finance this capital expansion, farm 
sector total outstanding debt swells to $545 billion in 2000 — 
an average annual growth rate of 6.4 percent and a tripling of the 
1980 level. 
The assumption of a savings ratio of 0.61 plus only a moderate 
rise in net farm income means that the U.S. farm sector becomes much 
more highly leveraged. The debt/asset (D/A) ratio (expressed as 
real total outstanding debt/real stock of physical assets) stands at 
0.29 in 1980-1981. A steady demand for credit to finance continued 
capital investment pushes this ratio to an average of 0.70 over 
1996-2000 (Table 10). 
This is a startling result. A D/A ratio in U.S. agriculture 
of 0.70 seems unheard of. The farm sector has always been assumed 
to maintain a fairly stable D/A ratio of approximately 0.16 to 0.17 
(14). However, an examination of historical data shows this not to 
be the case. If viewed in real terms, farm sector total debt has 
increased at an average annual growth rate of 5.3 percent from 1950 
Table 10. Financial analytical ratios for base projection 
1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1991- 1996-
1981 1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 
(1) Internai financing 
Total capital flow 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow 
(3) Outstanding debt 
Physical assets 
(4) Average annual 
growth rate for: 
Physical assets 
Outstanding debt 
(5) Outstanding debt 
Annual net farm income 
.54 .53 .50 
.46 .47 .50 
.29 .33 .38 
1.3 1.1 0.9 
10.5 8.6 8.1 
5.60 6.73 8.23 
.46 .49 .54 
.54 .51 .46 
.54 .60 .70 
0.9 1.0 1.0 
6.9 5.0 3.8 
12.65 13.45 14.38 
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to 1980 (Table 11). At the same time, the real stock of physical 
assets grew at an average annual rate of only 0.7 percent. The 
result of these two trends is a near quadrupling of the real D/A 
ratio to a level of 0.25 in 1980, representing an average annual 
growth in this ratio of 4.5 percent. 
If this historical trend is indicative of the future, can the 
U.S. farm sector be expected to maintain a D/A ratio in the 0.20-
0.25 range? The model in question answers this question, no. The 
model projects total outstanding debt increasing at a real annual 
growth rate of 6.1 percent. This is slightly higher than the 30-year 
average listed above, but it is less than the 1975-1980 rate of 6.8 
percent. The model projects a real annual growth in the value of 
physical assets of 1.0 percent per year — 0.3 percent higher than 
the 1950-1980 average. 
If the model is projecting an unrealistically high D/A ratio, 
then the annual increase in debt is overstated, the growth in value 
of physical assets is understated, or some combination thereof exists 
Annual increases in debt will depend upon two things; net income 
and the savings ratio. The savings ratio is set at a value which 
proved the average for the past 10 as well as the past 20 years. 
This does not seem an unreasonable assumption. To extend the results 
alternative savings ratios are considered in the next section. Net 
income will depend upon the model's ability to sort out supply and 
demand relationships in U.S. agriculture. Exports play an important 
role in determining demand levels and market prices. Alternative 
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Table 11. Farm sector debt, assets, net income, and analytical 
ratios, 1950-1980^ 
(1967 dollars) 
Total Stock of Net 
outstanding physical farm Debt Debt 
debt assets income Assets Net farm income 
(millions) — 
1950 14,886 223,781 18,929 .067 .79 
1951 15,731 228,931 20,481 .069 .77 
1952 17,680 233,074 18,819 .076 .94 
1953 18,622 236,293 16,205 .079 1.15 
1954 18,066 240,340 15,370 .075 1.18 
1955 19,229 243,253 14,096 .079 1.36 
1956 20,789 245,338 13,826 .085 1.50 
1957 21,093 244,906 13,149 .086 1.60 
1958 22,166 246,155 15,206 .090 1.46 
1959 24,257 249,482 12,271 .097 1.98 
1960 26,618 249,804 12,985 .107 2.05 
1961 27,667 249,407 13,345 .111 2.07 
1962 29,359 249,934 13,316 .117 2.20 
1963 31,987 250,793 12,835 .128 2.49 
1964 34,942 251,992 11,294 .139 3.09 
1965 37,312 250,772 13,650 .149 2.73 
1966 40,379 253,170 14,362 .159 2.81 
1967 42,871 253,839 12,339 .169 3.47 
1968 44,122 257,012 11,825 .172 3.73 
1969 43,520 259,277 13,017 .168 3.34 
1970 43,293 260,566 12,168 .166 3.56 
1971 43,370 261,194 12,063 .166 3.60 
1972 43,373 264,988 14,896 .164 2.91 
1973 47,747 266,810 25,056 .179 1.91 
1974 49,686 270,504 17,691 .184 2.81 
1975 50,567 270,302 15,183 .187 3.33 
1976 53,064 270,747 10,957 .196 4.84 
1977 55,989 270,504 10,887 .207 5.14 
1978 58,713 273,663 14,268 .215 4.12 
1979 63,972 274,955 14,253 .233 4.49 
1980 70,156 279,000 n.a. .251 n.a. 
^Source: (20). 
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export levels are examined in a later section and will be shown to 
greatly influence the D/A ratio which occurs. 
An even more important issue than the actual level of the D/A 
ratio is the relative burden this amount of debt places upon the 
farm sector's income stream. An examination of the debt/income (D/l) 
ratio enables this issue to be addressed and provides a sense of how 
realistic a 0.70 D/A ratio might be. Under the base projection, the 
D/l ratio rises from a 1980-1981 average of 5.60 to a 1996-2000 
average of 14.38. This implies that if farmers committed every 
dollar of net income towards the reduction of outstanding debt, it 
would take over 14 years to bring total debt to zero. This level 
is clearly outside of the historical limits for the D/I ratio (Table 11). 
The base projection reflects what will happen if farm income 
increases only slightly while farmers continue to rely upon debt 
financing for a sizable share of annual total capital flow. The 
model projects a modest real increase in the stock of physical assets 
while total outstanding debt grows at a much more rapid pace. Farm 
sector annual net income can only service so much debt. At some 
point, farm lenders will stop lending because future expected income 
flows cannot justify further extension of credit. This point will 
likely be reached long before the D/l ratio reaches 14. Whether or 
not the farm sector can service a debt level this high depends upon 
the repayment terms. Only if the repayment period is lengthened 
considerably could annual debt service be brought to a manageable 
level. 
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For these reasons, the model is not entirely realistic in project­
ing a D/A ratio of 0.70. The model does reveal the severe problems 
that may occur in the future if farm sector total debt continues to 
rise more rapidly than the income flows which must service it. Such 
a trend will create a crucial conflict in which rising farm debt will 
place mounting burdens upon a strained income stream. In such 
circumstances, the farm sector must reduce its capital flow demands, 
commit more Internal funds toward capital financing, or negotiate 
repayment terms which are more manageable. 
Should the trend toward a larger D/A ratio continue, the farm 
sector will become increasingly subject to the effects of general 
economic and monetary policy. A traditionally high share of internal 
financing has insulated U.S. agriculture from recurring business 
cycles in the past. However, as more and more credit is borrowed 
from the nonagricultural sector of the economy, the farm sector will 
increasingly face the same degree of volatility in money markets as 
other industries. Individual farm operators will become much more 
vulnerable to downturns in farm prices because of their leveraged 
financial position. 
Credit Projections Under 
Alternative Savings Ratios 
The savings ratio (internal financing/net farm income) plays a 
critical role in the farm sector's demand for credit. Increases in 
debt act as the residual supplier of financing not provided by internal 
funds. To the extent that farmers commit fewer internal funds to 
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capital investment, they become more dependent upon nonagricultural 
sources of funds. This implies a farm sector which feels the impacts 
of monetary policy more swiftly and fully than it otherwise would. 
An important question concerning future farm sector capital flows is 
the extent to which U.S. agriculture will rely upon credit for its 
capital expansion. 
Three distinct savings ratios are employed to compare alternative 
credit demands with the base: 0.3, 0.45, and 0.75. These three 
rates represent savings at 50, 75, and 125 percent of the base rate. 
Each one percent increase in the savings ratio adds $312 million 
in 1980 and $375 million in 2000 to the amount of internal financing 
available in the base projection. When the savings rate drops to 
0.30, debt financing must increase by 58 percent in order to meet 
capital flow demand (Table 12). Similarly, a 25 percent drop in the 
savings ratio to 0.45 implies a rise in debt financing of 30 percent. 
A 25 percent increase in the savings ratio to 0.75 allows a reduction 
in debt financing of 27 percent. 
A 0.30 savings ratio has not occurred in the postwar period — 
so this result may lie only in the hypothetical realm. However, a 
savings ratio of 0.45 has occurred as recently as 1974 (see Figure 6). 
Should this rate prevail in the future, U.S. agriculture's capital 
expansion would become dependent upon credit for 60 percent of its 
financing. This would have far-reaching impacts upon the quantity 
of and conditions surrounding credit extension by the rural banking 
community and the farm credit system. 
Table 12. Farm sector financing and total outstanding debt under alternative savings ratios, 
1980-20003 
0.3 0.45 0.75 
Period 
Internal 
financing 
Increase 
in debt 
Total out­
standing 
debt 
Internal 
financing 
Increase 
in debt 
Total out­
standing 
debt 
Internal 
financing 
Increase 
in debt 
Total out­
standing 
debt 
(millions of dollars) 
1980-
1981 9,432 26,340 190,768 14,149 21,623 183,770 23,580 12,192 169,594 
1982-
1983 9,301 26,090 242,583 13,951 21,440 226,283 23,252 12,139 193,324 
1984-
1985 8,902 27,389 296,665 13,353 22,938 271,349 22,255 14,036 220,358 
1986-
1990 8,476 28,882 396,624 12,714 24,644 356,348 21,189 16,169 275,440 
1991-
1995 9,202 29,272 542,600 13,843 24,631 480,316 23,005 15,469 355,394 
1996-
2000 10,612 29,597 689,714 15,918 24,291 602,313 26,531 13,678 427,160 
^All amounts expressed in 1978 dollars. 
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The savings rate which predominates in the future will have 
significant influence upon the total outstanding debt of the farm 
sector. Should this rate fall as low as 0.30, total outstanding 
debt would grow to a level of nearly $750 billion by the year 2000 
(Figure 7). This level represents an increase of 37 percent over the 
base trend and would create a highly leveraged D/A ratio of 1.0. 
A more realistic drop of the savings rate to 0.45 would increase 
total debt by 20 percent to $650 billion in 2000. The D/A ratio 
would stand at .87 — still a more leveraged position than historically 
observed. On the other hand, total farm debt in 2000 would fall 17 
percent below the base trend should farmers increase their savings 
rate to 0.75. This would make a 1996-2000 average debt/asset ratio 
of 0.61. As discussed above, D/A ratios this high may not actually 
be reached because of strains on the income and stream. 
Clearly, the future savings ratio will play a critical part 
in determining future credit requirements for U.S. agriculture. 
Researchers have not dealt with the issue of what parameters influence 
the amount farmers save. A rigorous examination of this topic would 
add considerable refinement to analyzing and projecting credit demands. 
While this study does not attempt to determine the savings ratio 
endogenously, the preceding analysis does allow a rough comparison 
of credit demands under alternative savings ratios. 
Alternative Export Levels 
The level of commodity exports impacts capital flows in a two­
fold manner: (1) by affecting total production which in turn will 
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Figure 7. Projected total outstanding debt under alternative savings 
ratios, 1980-2000 
directly influence the amounts of necessary capital inputs; and (2) 
by affecting net farm income which will bear upon both capital and 
credit demands. Exports are not endogenous to the CARD model and 
are handled fairly simplistically. Commodity exports increase at the 
historical trend rate in the base projection. Exports are exogenously 
set at 0.5 and 1.5 times this base trend in two alternatives. 
Exports impact production by changing commodity inventories 
which, in conjunction with available supplies, determine commodity 
prices. The boom in U.S. exports in 1973 is a prime example of how 
rapidly exports can affect market prices. Figure 8 details changing 
production quantities under the three export levels. With reduced 
exports, 2000 production of feed grains, wheat, and soybeans drops by 
5 to 7 percent from the base level. The weakened demand has major 
impact upon commodity prices. Feed grain, wheat, and soybean average 
prices over 1996-2000 drop by two-thirds from base levels (Table 13). 
High export demand, on the other hand, increases production of 
the four major commodities by 5 to 6 percent in 2000. The strong 
demand in export markets draws down inventories and pushes prices 
up markedly. Base average prices in 1996-2000 climb by more than 85 
percent for feed grains, wheat, and soybeans (Table 13). 
These changes in production and prices are directly transferred 
into effects upon income. With exports at half the historical trend, 
average U.S. net farm income in 1996-2000 is negative at $-8.4 billion 
a level 124 percent below base (Figure 9 and Table 14). Strong exports 
at 1.5 times the historical trend boost prices and send U.S. net farm 
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Table 13. Estimated crop prices under alternative export levels, 
1996-2000 average^ 
.5 trend 1.5 trend 
Base Price 
Percent 
change Price 
Percent 
change 
Feed grains 
($/ton) 63.00 21.43 -65.9 116.18 +84.4 
Wheat 
($/bu.) 1.85 0.62 -66 .5 4.02 +117.3 
Soybeans 
($/bu.) 7.61 2.45 -67.8 14.67 +92.7 
Cotton lint 
(C/pound) 56.03 40.24 -28.2 83.97 +49.9 
^All amounts in 1978 dollars. 
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Table 14. Capital, credit, and income projections under 
alternative export levels, 1980-2000^ 
ALTERNATIVE 
YEAR BASE "" 3.5 TIME 1.5 TlwE 
———— 
TOTAL CAPITAL FLOW 
1980-1981 35771.72 358 78 .88 35665. 91 
1982-1983 35391.13 35514 .75 35274. 25 
1984-1985 36291.34 36301 .19 36293. 94 
1986-1990 37357.95 36860 .22 37957. 25 
1991-1995 38474.22 36914 .51 42090. 97 
1996-2000 40209.31 36927 .17 45788. 82 
INTERNAL FUNDS 
1980-1981 19179.16 I 7853 .48 20526. 06 
1982-1983 18911.88 16145 .90 21717. 93 
1984-1985 18100.33 13604 .71 22664. 91 
1986-1990 17234.06 8793 .00 25899. 1 7 
1991-1995 18765.52 2268 .29 38214. 63 
1996-2000 21578.10 0 .00 45788. 82 
INCREASE I N DEBT 
1980-198 1 16592.57 18025 .39 15139. 87 
1982-1983 16479.27 1 9368 .87 13556. 33 
1984-1985 18191.02 22696 .50 13629. 05 
1986-1990 20123.90 28067 .22 12058. 06 
1991-1995 19708.70 34646 .22 3876. 34 
1596-2000 18631.21 3692 7 .  1 7 0. 00 
U.S.NET FARM INCOME 
1980-1981 31441.24 29268 .01 33649. 23 
1982-1983 31003.07 26468 .70 35603. lt> 
1984-1985 29672.68 22302 .80 37155. 59 
1986-1990 28252.55 14414 .76 42457. 71 
1991-1995 30763.14 34 72 .27 62646. 95 
1996-2000 35373.96 -8459 .99 85359. 31 
- TOTAL OUTSTANO ING FARM DEBT 
1980-1981 176181.40 1790 09 .50 1 73296. 80 
1982-1983 208648.80 216503 .00 200679. 30 
1984-1985 244097.30 260137 .60 227841. 60 
1986-1990 333264.60 381264 .30 284621. 40 
1991-19 95 433343.20 548271 • 1 0 314703. 50 
1996-2000 527473.90 733180 .60 314292. 30 
^All amounts expressed in millions of 1978 dollars. 
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income up 142 percent over base to an $85.4 billion over 1996-2000. 
Per farm net losses equal $5,000 in 2000 under the 0.5 trend, while 
the strong 1.5 trend produces net farm income of $41,000. Export 
levels are thus seen to significantly affect the prosperity of 
America's farmers. 
Changes in production and net income produce different quantities 
and patterns of capital flow. Total capital flow is affected minimally 
in 1980 by the level of exports, but by 2000 the impacts are quite 
noticeable. Average annual total capital flow in 1996-2000 is 8 percent 
less under the weak export trend and 14 percent higher under the 
strong trend (Figure 10 and Table 14). Most of these changes in 
capital flow may be explained by two principal components : real estate 
and machinery (Table 15). 
Under the 0.5 export trend, 1996-2000 average real estate capital 
flow falls by 10 percent as land prices and total harvested acreage 
decline. The rising commodity prices which occur with the 1.5 export 
trend drive up land prices and increase real estate capital flow by 
10 percent over the base 1996-2000 average. The 0.5 trend level of 
exports diminishes harvested acreage and, combined with the afore­
mentioned income effects, results in a 9 percent decline in 1996-2000 
average machinery capital flow. Conversely, the 1.5 trend causes a 
15 percent Increase in average machinery capital flow in 1996-2000. 
The most striking impact of the alternative export levels is 
their effect upon credit demands and financing implications. As net 
income falls with 0.5 trend exports, the farm sector must turn to 
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73 
Table 15. Projected capital flows under alternative 
export levels, 1980-2000^ 
ALTERNATIVE 
YEAR 0.5 TIME 1.5 TIME 
REAL ESTATE CAPITAL FLOW 
1980-
1982-
1984-
1986-
1991 
1996-
1980-
1982-
1984-
1986-
1991-
1996-
1980-
1982-
1984-
1986 
1991-
1996-
1980-
1982-
1984-
1986-
1991-
1996-
1981 
1983 
1985 
•1990 
1995 
•2000 
1981 
1983 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000  
13338.22 
13878.34 
14318.84 
15074.02 
16274.47 
17673.85 
13320.38 
13818.93 
14197.41 
14764.64 
15474.19 
16060.66 
13358.14 
13941.33 
14445.46 
15381.0 5 
17153.30 
19402.76 
NET CHANGE IN FINANCIAL ASSETS 
-614.52 
-522.77 
-259.73 
-986.29 
-1295.69 
-2638.97 
-479.92 
-240.30 
143.25 
1399.60 
2671.16 
2985.05 
-751.27 
—80 8. 46 
—663. 56 
-3298. 46 
-1149.14 
0,00 
BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS CAPITAL FLOW 
1981 
1983 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
5460.79 
5537.67 
5574.88 
5641.15 
5844.04 
6129.10 
5419.76 
5442.95 
5411.45 
5312.14 
5149.02 
4937.11 
5502.75 
5634. 10 
5741.13 
5975.04 
6631. 77 
7468.99 
MACHINERY CAPITAL FLOW: PURCHASES + DEP. 
1981 
1983 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
16039.49 
16014.58 
16186.66 
16224.14 
16285.89 
16581.95 
16005.28 
15887.97 
15929.52 
15692.31 
15298.30 
15046.80 
16074.32 
16144.05 
16450.62 
16780.52 
17617.34 
19002.57 
NET CHANGE IN STORED CROP INVENTORIES 
1980-1981 396.90 450.09 343.52 
1982-1983 -48.41 45.19 -141.14 
1984-1985 141.22 262.47 22.07 
1986-1990 209.92 324.75 86.22 
1991-1995 113.52 244.33 71.99 
1996-2000 59.93 166.07 -810.41 
NET CHANGE IN LIVESTOCK INVENTORIES 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
1150.85 
531.75 
329.50 
330.09 
351.64 
336.75 
1163.30 
560.05 
357.12 
302.84 
199.56 
89.23 
1138.47 
504.37 
303.24 
343.75 
616. 58 
724.93 
^All amounts expressed in millions of 1978 dollars. 
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increased debt financing for capital expansion. Outstanding debt 
grows at an average annual rate of 7.8 percent to $770 billion by 
the year 2000 — an increase of 41 percent over base (Figure 11). 
The result is a highly leveraged U.S. agriculture with a D/A ratio 
in excess of 1.0 by 2000 (Table 16). While total capital flow has 
fallen only by 5 percent, the financing has shifted dramatically 
toward debt sources. Debt financing rises from a 1980 50 percent 
share of total capital flow to a full 100 percent share in 2000. 
The D/I ratio rises dramatically to 26 in 1986-1990 and climbs 
to the incredible level of 157 in 1991-1995 (Table 16). Clearly, 
the farm sector cannot manage a debt load this high — this point 
will not actually be reached. Once again, the model unrealistically 
projects a growth in debt which cannot be sustained by the income 
flows. However, the model does indicate the grave financial stress 
which will afflict U.S. agriculture should world export markets 
significantly decline. In such circumstances, the government would 
feel considerable pressure to stimulate demand and/or provide loan 
assistance to debt-ridden farmers. 
With the strong exports of the 1.5 trend, just the opposite 
takes place. U.S. net farm income rises sharply — allowing the 
share of total capital flow internally financed to rise from 58 
percent in 1980 to 100 percent in 2000. The farm sector becomes 
less leveraged than the base projection and has an average D/A ratio 
of 0.40 in 1996-2000 compared to 0.70 for the base. The financial 
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Figure 11. Projected total outstanding debt under alternative export 
levels, 1980-2000 
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Table 16. Financial analytical ratios for alternative export levels 
1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1991- 1996-
1981 1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Base 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow 
(3) Outstanding debt 
Physical assets 
.46 .47 .50 .54 .51 .46 
.29 .33 .38 .54 .60 .70 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
Outstanding debt 10.5 8.6 8.1 6.9 5.0 3.8 
5.60 6.73 8.23 12.65 13.45 14.38 (5) Outstanding debt Annual net income 
.5 Export trend 
•" -^4 .06 0.0 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow .50 .54 .63 .76 .94 100.0 
(3) Outstanding debt ^9 .34 .41 .58 .82 1.09 
Physical assets 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 
Outstanding debt 11.3 9.8 9.6 8.7 7.3 5.6 
"'ESrSFiEs ^-12 B.18 11.66 26.45 157.91 -
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Table 16. Continued 
1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1991- 1996-
1981 1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 
1.5 Export trend 
Internal financing gg ,^2 .62 .68 .91 100.0 
Total capital flow 
Increase in debt ,42 .38 .38 .32 .09 0.0 
Total capital flow 
Outstanding debt .28 .32 .35 .42 .43 .40 
Physical assets 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.8 
Outstanding debt 9.6 7.3 6.4 4.7 1.3 0.0 
3.68 Outstanding debt 5.15 5.64 6.13 6.70 5.02 
Annual net income 
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position of U.S. agriculture strengthens considerably as the D/l 
ratio falls from 5.15 in 1980-1981 to 3.68 in 1996-2000. 
The level of exports which actually occurs in the future will, 
in all likelihood, not follow one of the simplistic paths simulated 
here. However, these results indicate that farm sector capital flows 
exhibit distinct patterns of change under different export levels. 
Weak export demand will produce significantly lower income, slightly 
lower annual capital flows, greatly increased debt financing, and 
quite likely an unbearable debt strain upon income flows. Strong 
export demand will yield higher net income, slightly higher total 
capital flow, and much less dependence upon external financing. 
Alternative Price Supports 
The government is assumed to support commodity prices by inter­
vening in markets and maintaining its own reserves. Prices for the 
five major endogenous crops are supported at levels of 75 percent 
and 90 percent of parity (see Table 6). Support levels become the 
market prices, since they lie above those prices which free market 
conditions would bring about. For the 1996-2000 average, the 75 
percent parity alternative results in the following increases over 
base prices; feed grains, 82 percent; wheat, 181 percent; soybeans, 
57 percent; and cotton, 38 percent. Similarly, the 90 percent parity 
support alternative raises feed grain prices 118 percent, wheat 203 
percent, soybeans 79 percent, and cotton 65 percent. 
These high prices bring about increased production (Figure 12). 
Most of the increase takes place in feed grains and wheat. Average feed 
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Figure 12. Projected crop production under alternative price supports 
1980-2000 
X = BASE, Y = 90% PARITY, Z = 75% PARITY 
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grain output over 1996-2000 climbs 7 and 11 percent under the two 
price support levels. Wheat production rises by 19 and 23 percent. 
Soybean and cotton output increase only marginally, because their 
prices increase relatively less than feed grains or cotton. The 
latter two commodities absorb the greatest increase in production. 
The effect of the support programs is to greatly enlarge govern­
ment held inventories. By the year 2000, feed grain reserves stand 
at 295 million tons for the 75 percent program and 490 million tons 
for the 90 percent parity level — increases of 1,000 and 2,000 
percent over base levels. Wheat government reserves increase 40-fold 
over base level to 9.8 billion and 12.0 billion bushels for the two 
respective support prices. These reserves represent a significant 
cost to society. (The model does not compute the cost of these 
programs.) The high support prices result in a large transfer of 
income to farmers. 
Base projection annual farm sector net income more than doubles — 
rising to an average of $77.6 billion over 1996-2000 (Table 17 and 
Figure 13). Prices at 90 percent parity nearly triple base net farm 
income to $93.3 billion over the 1996-2000 average. With farm numbers 
declining, 1996-2000 per farm net income rises to $39,800 and $43,000 
for the two support levels — the highest levels attained under any 
of the alternative projections. 
The combination of high commodity prices and sharply higher net 
farm income increases total capital flow significantly (Table 17 and 
Figure 14). Total annual capital flow in 1996-2000 averages $47.1 
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Table 17. Capital, credit, and income projections under 
alternative price supports, 1980-2000^ 
ALTERNATIVE 
YEAR "BASE ~ 75*~ "90% 
TOTAL CAPITAL FLOW 
1980-1981 35771.72 35253 .16 349 07.50 
1982-1983 35391.13 35666 .88 36014.06 
1984-1985 36291.34 37917 .00 40704.31 
1986-1990 37357.95 41026 .86 43331.09 
1991-1995 38474.22 44238 .32 46733.66 
1996-2000 40209.31 4 70 76 .14 49761.07 
INTERNAL FUNDS 
1980-1981 19179.16 24624 .76 29710.81 
1982-1983 18911.83 2 6544 .  30 31378.35 
1984-1985 18100.33 28226 .40 34607.69 
1986-1990 17234.06 32563 .21 40120.51 
1991-1995 18765.52 40775 .23 46733.66 
1996-2000 21578.10 46840 .78 49761.07 
INCREASE IN DEBT 
1980-1981 16592.57 1 0628 .4 1 5196.71 
1982-1983 16479.27 91 22 .10 4635.73 
1984-1985 18191.02 9690 .62 6096.63 
1986-1990 20123.90 8463 .66 3210.59 
1991-1995 19708.70 3463 .09 0.00 
1996-2000 18631.21 235 .36 0.00 
U.S.NET FARM I NCOME 
1980-1981 31441.24 40368 .47 48706.25 
1982-1983 31003.07 435 16 .09 51439.94 
1984-1985 29672.68 46272 .81 56733.94 
1986-1990 28252.55 53382 .33 6577 1.31 
1S91-1995 30763.14 66844 .63 81262.63 
1996-2000 35373.96 77637 .69 93279.50 
TOTAL OUTSTANDING FARM DEBT 
1980-1981 176181.40 167557.60 
1982-1983 206648.80 185601.10 
1984-1985 244097.30 204838.10 
1986-1990 333264.60 245107.10 
1991-1995 433343.20 267839.60 
1996-2000 527473.90 270682.50 
159631.00 
167332.80 
179855.20 
197370.60 
198743.80 
198743.80 
^All amounts expressed in millions of 1978 dollars. 
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Figure 13. Projected net farm income under alternative price supports, 
1980-2000 
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Figure 14. Projected total capital flow under alternative price 
supports, 1980-2000 
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billion and $49.8 billion for the two support levels — increases of 
17 and 24 percent above the base. These amounts are the highest 
capital flow demands for any of the alternative projections. 
Real land prices jump by 13 to 25 percent from 1996-2000 base 
levels. Real estate capital flow rises accordingly and makes up 
roughly 40 percent of the total increase in capital flow (Table 18) . 
Average annual machinery capital flow increases 14 and 20 percent 
over 1996-2000 base levels as production and net income rise in the 
two support programs. Financial asset capital flow falls to 0.0 in 
1991-2000, because the level of financial assets hits a lower limit 
of $15 billion and is not permitted to decline further. This represents 
a minimum level for demand and time deposits which is necessary for 
business operations. Because the level of financial assets remains 
at this lower limit, annual change is zero. 
The higher net farm incomes brought about by support price 
programs greatly influence farm sector capital financing. The 75 
percent parity price support allows the share of annual capital flow 
financed internally to rise to 0.69 over 1980-1981 and occupy a 
nearly complete 0.99 share over 1996-2000 (Table 19). Total outstand­
ing debt rises to $207 billion in 2000 — half of the base level 
(Figure 15). This results in a modest increase in the D/A ratio 
from .27 in 1980-1981 to .33 in 1996-2000; the latter being less 
than half of the base level. The high net incomes also allow debt 
servicing to remain quite manageable. The D/l ratio rises slightly 
Table 18. Projected capital flows under alternative 
price supports, 1980-2000^ 
ALTERNATIVE 
YEAR 8ÂSË Tlx 90% 
1980 
1982 
1984 
1986 
1991 
1996 
1980-
1982-
1984-
1986-
1991-
1996-
1980-
1982-
1984-
1986 
1991-
1996-
1980-
1982-
1984 
1986-
1991-
1996-
•1981 
-1983 
-1985 
-1990 
-1995 
-2000 
1981 
1983 
•1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
REAL ESTATE CAPITAL FLOW 
13338.22 
13878.34 
14318.84 
15074.02 
16274.47 
17673.85 
13472.00 
14203.63 
14769.68 
15875.75 
17686.62 
19599.15 
13586.91 
14511.26 
15135.50 
16378.77 
18375.53 
20407.34 
NET CHANGE IN FINANCIAL ASSETS 
-614.52 
-522.77 
-259.73 
-986.29 
-1295.69 
-2638.97 
-  1197.79 
-  1264.03 
-1135.03 
-2635.41 
0.00 
0.00 
-1747.51 
-1876.69 
-141.91 
-1255.86 
O.OO 
0.00 
BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS CAPITAL FLOW 
1981 
1983 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
5460.79 
5537.67 
5574.88 
5641.15 
5844.04 
6129.10 
5629.27 
5828.75 
5995.55 
6319.18 
6898.47 
7440.52 
5786.53 
6038.81 
6264.19 
6684.32 
7357.03 
7959.78 
MACHINERY CAPITAL FLOW: PURCHASES + DEP. 
•1981 
•1983 
•1985 
•1990 
•1995 
• 2 0 0 0  
16039.49 
16014.58 
16186.66 
16224.14 
16285.89 
16581.95 
16264.31 
16749.56 
17167.98 
17621.37 
18262.68 
18879.08 
16466.06 
17311.80 
17786.03 
18374.16 
19137.37 
19846.28 
NET 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
NET 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
CHANGE IN STORED CROP INVENTORIES 
396.90 -65.46 -335.31 
-48.41 -754.84 -1153.77 
141.22 61.65 39.37 
209.92 35.97 49.71 
113.52 52.65 61.52 
59.93 45.54 33.99 
CHANGE IN LIVESTOCK INVENTORIES 
1150.85 1150.85 1150.85 
531.75 903.77 1182.66 
329.50 1057.18 1621.14 
330.09 1242.31 1844.14 
351.64 1337.90 1802.21 
336.75 1111.86 1513.68 
^All amounts expressed in millions of 1978 dollars. 
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Table 19. Financial analytical ratios for alternative price supports 
1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1991- 1996-
1981 1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Base 
(1) Internal financing .53 .50 .46 .49 .54 
Total capital flow 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow .46 .47 .50 .54 .51 .46 
(3) Outstanding debt .29 .33 .38 .54 .60 .70 
Physical assets 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
Outstanding debt 10.5 8.6 8.1 6.9 5.0 3.8 
5.60 6.73 8.23 12.65 13.45 14.38 (5) Outstanding debt Annual net income 
75% Parity 
Internal financing yg go go 
Total capital flow 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow .31 .26 .26 .21 .08 .01 
(3) Outstanding debt oc 
Physical assets .33 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 2.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.4 
Outstanding debt 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.8 0.9 0.1 
(5) Outstanding debt 4.43 4.59 4.01 3.49 
Annual net income 
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Table 19. Continued 
1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1991- 1996-
1981 1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 
90% Parity 
Internal fxnancxng gg gy ,35 . 9 3  100.0 100.0 
Total capital flow 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow .15 .13 .15 .07 0.0 0.0 
(3) Outstanding debt .26 .26 .27 .28 .25 .23 
Physical assets 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 2.8 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.4 
Outstanding debt 1.0 1.9 1.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Outstanding debt 3.28 3.25 3.17 3.00 2.45 2.13 
Annual net income 
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Figure 15. Projected total outstanding debt under alternative price 
supports, 1980-2000 
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above 4.15 over the first projection decade but then falls to a 
comfortable 3.49 level in 1996-2000 (Table 19). 
The 90 percent support program allows for even less debt 
financing. Internal financing occupies a full 100 percent share 
of total annual capital flow by 1990. Total outstanding debt 
rises only to $198 billion, permitting the D/A ratio to actually 
decline from a 1980 value of .26 to a 2000 level of .23. The D/I 
ratio also declines over this same period to 2.13 — the lowest value 
for any of the alternative projections (Table 19 and Figure 15). 
These two support programs would have tremendous impact upon 
capital and credit demands. Disregarding their cost to society, 
these programs would boost net farm income sizably. This would 
increase capital demands and, by increasing internal financing, would 
sharply reduce credit requirements. 
Alternative Energy Prices 
Outside of commodity exports and government policy, the variable 
which is most likely to have significant impact upon U.S. agriculture 
in the next two decades is the price of energy. Two alternative 
energy price trends are compared with the base to examine capital 
flow adjustments. The price of diesel fuel affects all of the fuel 
indices and important energy-related inputs in the model and is 
therefore used as the variable which is adjusted. The base diesel 
price increases in real terms at a rate of 0.50 per gallon per year — 
giving a 2000 level of $1.13. Alternative I doubles this trend to 
l.Oç per gallon per year for a 2000 price of $1.46. Finally, Alternative I 
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quadruples the base trend for a 2.0$ real increase per year yielding 
a 2000 price for diesel of $1.90 per gallon. 
Rising energy prices directly impact production by reducing the 
use of energy-intensive inputs — mostly notably, fertilizers. Nitrogen 
application decreases the most under Alternative II. Base per acre 
nitrogen application declines by the following percentages in 1996-2000: 
feed grains, 0.8; wheat, 5.9; soybeans, 9.0; and cotton, 17.5. 
Phosphorus and potassium use also decline significantly. These 
reductions in fertilizer use result in drops in crop yields. Average 
yields in 1996-2000 fall the most for feed grains and wheat. Both 
commodities register equal percentage declines — roughly 1 and 3 
percent under Alternatives I and II. 
Commodity production for the four major commodities falls between 
1980 and 1990, because yields are falling (Figure 16). As production 
declines in the face of increasing total demand, crop inventories 
fall and, consequently, crop prices rise. Commodity prices are very 
sensitive to inventory levels. Prices increase sharply when inventories 
approach an imposed lower limit in the model. The cumulative effect of 
declining production is to significantly reduce inventories. Prices 
thus rise markedly and elicit increases in planted acreage. From 
1990-1995 on, production of feed grains, wheat, and cotton increases 
because of this "income" effect. 
Declining yields and inventories push prices up dramatically. 
Alternative I sends feed grain, wheat, and soybean prices up by 
approximately 12 percent over base levels in 1996-2000 (Table 20) . 
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Figure 16. Projected crop production under alternative energy prices 
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Table 20. Estimated crop prices under alternative energy prices, 
1996-2000 average^ 
Alternative I Alternative II 
Base Price 
Percent 
change Price 
Percent 
change 
Feed grains 
($/ton) 63.00 71.66 +13.7 88.54 +40.5 
Wheat 
($/bu.) 1.85 2.08 +12.4 2.55 +37.8 
Soybeans 
($/bu.) 7.61 8.45 +11.0 10.13 +33.1 
Cotton lint 
(C/pound) 56.03 55.89 -0.2 56.00 
^All amounts in 1978 dollars. 
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The steeper energy prices in Alternative II result in 1996-2000 prices 
about 38 percent higher than base for these same three commodities. 
Cotton prices remain relatively constant, because cotton production 
is mostly unaffected by the rise in energy costs. 
Rising energy prices create a paradoxical situation for U.S. 
farms. While farm operators decry the rising cost of fuel and 
fertilizer, the increase in energy prices is good for them in the 
final analysis. The simple explanation is that U.S. net farm income 
increases conspicuously as energy prices rise. As U.S. agricultural 
output drops, the falling supply meets an inelastic, expanding demand 
for agricultural commodities. The result is net farm income which 
rises 17 percent above the 1996-2000 base average for Alternative I. 
Alternative II brings about an even greater 51 percent increase 
(Table 21 and Figure 17). Thus, the apparent contradiction: each 
farmer perceives rising energy costs to be detrimental, while in the 
aggregate it markedly raises U.S. net farm income. Per farm net 
income in 1996-2000 rises to $22,000 and $27,000 under Alternatives I 
and II. 
Total capital flow for the 1996-2000 average is nearly the same — 
$40.2 billion — for the base and Alternatives I and II. Only $35 
million separates the three values (Table 21 and Figure 18). The 
reason for this is a combination of an income and a substitution 
effect. The substitution effect causes a decline in machinery 
purchases as the cost of operating those machines increases. Average 
machinery capital flow drops by 3.3 percent in 1996-2000 from the 
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Table 21. Capital, credit, and income projections under 
alternative energy prices, 1980-2000^ 
ALTERNATIVE 
YEAR BASE I  1 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
TOTAL CAPITAL 
35771.72 
35391.13 
36291.34 
37357.95 
38474.22 
40209.31 
FLOW 
35757.41 
35287.44 
36088.13 
37016.87 
38023.85 
40222.20 
35728.75 
35080.03 
35681.25 
36331.35 
37225.36 
40244.92 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
INTERNAL 
19179.16 
18911.88 
18100.33 
17234.06 
18765.52 
21578.10 
FUNDS 
19187.27 
18931.44 
18303.00 
17866.57 
20378.96 
2 5329.18 
19203.49 
19120.26 
13706.56 
19127.60 
24360.77 
326V0.2j 
1980-1931 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-I 990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
INCREASE 
16592.57 
I 6479.27 
18 191.02 
20123.90 
1 9 7 0 3 . 7 }  
18631.21 
DEBT 
16570.13 
16306.02 
17785.15 
19150.31 
17644.88 
14893.01 
16525.27 
15959.77 
16Ç74.69 
1 72 03. 75 
12f64.59 
7554.68 
IN 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
U.S.NET FARM 
31441.24 
3 I 003.07 
29672.68 
28252.55 
30763.14 
35373.96 
INCOME 
31454.54 
31117.12 
30004,92 
29289.45 
33408.14 
4 1523.25 
31<81.14 
31:44.69 
30( 66. 50 
3i:i56. 7 1 
39935.72 
53 590.54 
TOTAL OUTSTANDING FARM DEBT 
1980-1981 
19 82- 19 33 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
17618 I.no 
208648.80 
244097.30 
333264.60 
433343.20 
527473.90 
176159.00 
208368.00 
243130.80 
328530.20 
419529.80 
497168.10 
176114.10 
207 806.60 
24/ 200.20 
31^(068.40 
390309.70 
431712.30 
All amounts expressed in millions of 1978 dollars. 
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Figure 17. Projected net farm income under alternative energy 
prices, 1980-2000 
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Figure 18. Projected total capital flow under alternative energy 
prices, 1980-2000 
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base in Alternative I and falls by 7.9 percent in Alternative II. At 
the same time, rising net farm income increases the value of land 
and buildings. Real estate and building capital flows increase by 
1.0 and 3.4 percent under the two respective trends (Table 22). 
This represents the income effect. While the substitution effect 
is stronger throughout the 1980s, by 1990-1995 the income effect is 
strong enough to bring total capital flow up to the base level — even 
producing a slight increase in the base average for 1996-2000. 
Rising income allows the capital financing burden to shift away 
from debt to internal sources. Internal financing accounts for 63 and 
81 percent of capital financing in 1996-2000 under the two rising 
energy price trends compared with only 54 percent in the base projec­
tion (Table 23). Rising farm prices also increase the value of real 
physical assets at an annual rate of 1.0 percent for Alternative I 
and 1.2 percent for Alternative II. At the same time, the growth in 
total outstanding debt declines from a base rate of 6.1 percent to 
5.7 percent and 4.9 percent for Alternatives I and II (Figure 19). 
This implies that the D/A ratio grows much less rapidly when energy 
prices are rising. The 1996-2000 average D/A ratio stands at 0.68 
under Alternative I, while the more rapid increase in energy prices 
in Alternative II gives a value of 0.58. 
The D/I ratio reveals that the farm sector is better able to 
manage increased debt the faster energy prices are rising. The D/l 
ratio rises from 5.60 to 11.97 over the 20-year projection period in 
Alternative I. This final value of 11.97 probably signifies an 
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Table 22. Capital, credit, and income projections under 
alternative energy prices, 1980-2000^ 
ALTERNATIVE 
YEAR BASE XI 
REAL ESTATE CAPITAL FLOW 
1980-1981 13338.22 13338.22 13338.22 
1982-1983 13878.34 13879.15 13880.75 
1984-1985 14318.84 14322.40 14329.43 
1986-1990 15074.02 15092.91 15129.95 
1991-1995 16274.47 16344.62 16471.71 
1996-2000 17673.85 17843.54 18290.81 
NET CHANGE IN FINANCIAL ASSETS 
1980-1981 -614. 52 -614 .52 -614. 52 
1982-1983 -522. 77 -528 .84 -540. 96 
1984-1985 -259. 73 -279 .83 -319. 87 
1986-1990 -986. 29 -1 164 .74 -1520. 35 
1991-1995 -1295. 69 -1736 .82 -2519. 39 
1996-2000 -2638. 97 -2346 .76 -1287. 36 
BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS CAPITAL FLOW 
1G80-1981 5460.79 5460 .84 5460. 92 
1982-1983 5537.67 5538 .76 5540. 93 
1984-1985 5 574.88 5579 .51 5588. 71 
1986-1990 5641.15 5660 .64 5699. 32 
1991-1995 5844.04 5902 .85 6040. 23 
1996-2000 6129.10 6271 .26 6583. 93 
MACHINERY CAPITAL FLOW: PURCHASES + DEP. 
1980-1981 16039.49 1 6025.12 15996. 40 
1982-1983 16014.58 1 5926.99 15751. 79 
1984-1985 16186.66 1 6016.58 15676. 16 
1986-1990 16224.14 1 5928.46 15336. 45 
1991-1995 16285.89 1 5838.88 14937. 77 
1996-2000 16581.95 1 6037.59 15270. 09 
NET CHANGE IN STORED CROP INVENTORI ES 
1980-1981 396.90 396.90 396. 90 
1982-1983 -48.41 —56.64 -73. 1 0 
1984-1985 141.22 127.20 99. 05 
1986-1990 209.92 189.37 146. 93 
1991-1995 113.52 88.42 46. 77 
1996-2000 59.93 -17.22 -355. 44 
NET CHANGE IN LIVESTOCK INVENTORIES 
1980-1981 1150.85 1150.85 1150.85 
1982-1983 531.75 528.03 520.60 
1984-1985 329.50 322.28 307.79 
1986-1990 330.09 322.35 306.20 
1991-1995 351.64 355.02 358.00 
1996-2000 336.75 341.71 455.53 
^All amounts expressed in millions of 1978 dollars. 
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Table 23. Financial analytical ratios for alternative energy prices 
1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1991- 1996-
1981 1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Base 
(1) Internal financing ^, 
Total capital flow .53 .50 .46 .49 .54 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow .46 .47 .50 .54 .51 .46 
(3) Outstanding debt _ ,6o . 7 0  
Physical assets 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
Outstanding debt 10.5 8.6 8.1 6.9 5.0 3.8 
Outstanding debt 5.60 6.73 8.23 12.65 13.45 14.38 
Annual net income 
Alternative I 
(1) Internal financing ^, 
Total capital flow .51 .48 .54 .63 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow .46 .46 .49 .52 .46 .37 
.3» .5° .6» .6» 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 
Outstanding debt 10.4 8.5 7.9 6.6 4.6 3.2 
» n.,. 
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Table 23. Continued 
1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1991- 1996-
1981 1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Alternative II 
(1) Internal financing 
Total capital flow 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow 
.54 .55 .52 .53 .65 .81 
.46 .45 .48 .47 .35 ,19 
Outstanding debt .29 .33 .38 .48 .56 .58 
Physical assets 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.6 
Outstanding debt 10.4 8.3 7.6 6.1 3.6 1.8 
Outstanding debt 5 . 5 9  6.63 7.86 10.18 9.77 8.00 
Annual net income 
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Figure 19. Projected total outstanding debt under alternative 
energy prices, 1980-2000 
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unrealistic strain on income unless the terms of repayment could be 
made more attractive. As discussed earlier, the farm sector will 
likely not reach this level before the burden of rising debt service 
forces a reduction in credit demands. 
The more dramatic rise in energy prices in Alternative II allows 
the farm sector to more capably manage a higher level of debt. The 
D/l ratio rises from 5.59 in 1980 to 10.18 over 1986-1990. However, 
the strong income effect permits the D/l ratio to fall over the 
second decade to a level of 8.00 (Table 23). The farm sector may or 
may not be able to sustain a D/l ratio this high. Nevertheless, it 
is significant that rising energy prices again create a paradox. 
While individual farmers perceive their financial situation as being 
adversely affected by rising energy costs, the debt strain upon income 
is actually less than it otherwise would be. 
Energy price increases actually benefit the farm sector. By 
restricting production, farm sector net income rises significantly. 
Capital flow demands will be subject to both an income and a substitu­
tion effect. Results show that by 2000, the income effect predominates. 
Sharp Increases in net farm income will allow internal sources to play 
a greater share in capital financing. Falling credit requirements 
and rising income suggest a farm sector which can better service 
higher levels of total outstanding debt. For a more complete analysis 
of the impacts of rising energy prices on U.S. agriculture, the reader 
should consult Christenson et al. (5). 
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Restrictive Credit Ceilings 
An important issue in the future of U.S. agriculture is the 
extent to which conditions in national money markets will be translated 
into the quantities and terms under which credit is made available to 
the agricultural sector. As the farm sector has grown more dependent 
upon national money markets for credit, agriculture has increasingly 
become aware of the pains that can accompany restrictive monetary 
policy. The extremely high interest rates which prevailed in the 
spring of 1980 serve as a good example of this. How tight monetary 
conditions in the future will affect production, income, capital 
flows, and capital financing is of interest to farmers and policy­
makers alike. 
The model, as noted earlier, does not contain interest rates as 
exogenous variables. A tight monetary policy can be simulated by 
placing a restrictive ceiling on the annual credit supply instead 
of raising interest rates. This amounts, in effect, to credit ration­
ing. After the base projection was made, two annual credit ceilings 
were chosen. The first alternative limits annual credit extensions 
to $14 billion. This is approximately a 30 percent reduction in base 
credit requirements. A second alternative restricts the annual 
increase in debt to $10 billion — roughly 50 percent of the base 
projection level. 
In each alternative, the model iterates one year to compute 
credit demand. If this amount exceeds the ceiling level, the model 
must reiterate and machinery purchases are reduced by the factor. 
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(0,80*(computed credit requirement - celling level)). Once the credit 
requirement is beneath the ceiling level, the model proceeds to the 
next year. The model continues this process until the 20-year projection 
is complete. Thus, credit rationing results in a direct reduction in 
machinery purchases and the stock of machinery capital inputs available 
for production. 
The reduction in machinery purchases results in a decline in 
crop yields. Yields are a function of time and the quantities of 
inputs available. As machinery stocks fall, yields drop because the 
production elasticity with respect to machinery is positive and no 
other input can be perfectly substituted for machinery. Average 
yields fall for all major crops except cotton. Cotton yields remain 
relatively constant, because the production elasticity with respect 
to machinery is very low. Total production falls from base levels 
through 1990 for feed grains, wheat, and soybeans (Figure 20). The 
$14 billion ceiling reduces 1984-1985 base production by 22 percent 
for feedgrains, 1.6 percent for wheat, and 1.6 percent for soybeans. 
The $10 billion ceiling causes feed grain, wheat, and soybean produc­
tion to each fall about 3.0 percent from 1984-1985 base levels. 
Declining production draws down inventories and boosts prices. 
This is the same effect noted with the above energy price alternatives. 
The $14 billion limitation on annual credit boosts feed grain, wheat, 
and soybean prices by approximately 16 percent in 1984-1985 and about 
18 percent in 1996-2000 over base average prices. The more severe 
$10 billion restriction pushes up prices for these same three 
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Figure 20, Projected crop production under restrictive credit 
ceilings, 1980-2000 
X = BASE, Y = $10 BILLION CEILING, Z = $14 BILLION CEILING 
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commodities by roughly 29 percent in 1984-1985 and approximately 31 
percent in 1996-2000 over base levels (Table 24). Rising commodity 
prices result in increased planted acreage. Commodity production 
actually increases from 1990 to 2000 over base levels as acreage 
harvested rises (Figure 20). In sum, credit rationing reduces yields 
causing prices to climb. This elicits Increased acreage commitments 
and results in more production in the 1990s. 
Restrictions on debt create the same sort of paradox as rising 
energy prices. Each farmer perceives the rationed credit as damaging 
to his own financial situation. In the aggregate, however, the 
resultingly higher farm prices actually raise farm sector net income 
(Figure 21). By the 1996-2000 period, average net farm income is 
one-third higher under the $14 billion ceiling and rises by over 55 
percent with the $10 billion restriction (Table 25). Per farm net 
income rises to $22,100 and $25,800 under the two respective ceilings 
compared with the base 1996-2000 average of $16,600. Credit ration­
ing is thus seen to benefit farmers by restraining supply in the face 
of inelastic and growing demand for agricultural commodities. 
Total capital flow is affected by both a substitution and an 
income effect. The substitution effect is actually a "ration" effect. 
It consists of the decline in machinery purchases brought about by 
the limited availability of debt financing. In 1984-1985, the $14 
billion limit reduces base machinery capital flow by 13 percent, 
while the $10 billion ceiling causes a 22 percent reduction (Table 26). 
Up until 1990, this "ration" effect is stronger than the income effect. 
Table 24. Estimated crop prices under restrictive debt ceilings 
Base $14 billion $10 billion 
1986-
1990 
1996-
2000 
1986-
1990 
Percent 
change 
1996-
2000 
Percent 
change 
1986-
1990 
Percent 
change 
1996-
2000 
Percent 
change 
Feed grains 
($/ton) 69.94 63.00 81.48 +16.5 77.30 +22.7 91.96 +31.5 84.30 +33.8 
Wheat 
($/bu.) 2.10 1.85 2.44 +16.2 2.17 +17.3 2.70 +28.6 2.38 +28.6 
Soybeans 
($/bu.) 7.38 7.61 8.48 +14.9 8.83 +16.0 9.38 +27.1 9.89 +30.0 
Cotton lint 
(ç/pound) 53.97 56.03 51.89 -3.9 52.55 -6.2 49.87 -7.6 51.10 -8.8 
^All amounts in 1978 dollars. 
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Fif^ure 21. Projected net farm income under restrictive credit ceilings, 
1980-2000 
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Table 25. Capital, credit, and income projections under 
restrictive credit ceilings, 1980-2000^ 
YEAR BASE 
ALTERNATIVE 
$14000" $ 1 0 0 0 0  
TOTAL CAPITAL FLOW 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
1980-198 I 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
35771.72 
35391.13 
36291.34 
37357,95 
33474.22 
40209.31 
INTERNAL 
19179.16 
18911.88 
18100.33 
17234.06 
18765.52 
21578.10 
35101.34 
33768.56 
33964.31 
35365.48 
39251.20 
42102.86 
FUNDS 
1923 0.4 8 
19492.62 
19741.42 
21118.81 
24770.84 
28721.36 
33028.41 
30767. 00 
32161.14 
34626.51 
40008.01 
42030,53 
19359.67 
20638.77 
22020, Oi 
24592. 55 
30392.77 
33495. Id 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
INCREASE 
16592.57 
16479.27 
18191.02 
20123.90 
19708.70 
18631.21 
DEBT 
15870.88 
14275.94 
14222.90 
14246.68 
14480.36 
13381.48 
13668.76 
10126. 23 
10141.13 
10033.96 
9615. 25 
8585. 35 
I N 
1980-198». 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
'J.S.NET FARM 
31441.24 
31003.07 
29672.68 
28252.55 
30763.14 
35373.96 
INCOME 
31525.38 
31955.12 
32362.99 
34621.00 
40607.95 
47084.22 
31737. 17 
33834. 03 
36098.41 
40315.67 
49824.23 
54910.17 
TOTAL OUTSTANDING FARM DEBT 
1980-1981 176131. 40 175444, 1 0 1 73242. 0 0 
1982-1983 208648. 80 203933, 00 193344. 60 
1984-1985 244097. 30 232458, 00 213631. 30 
19 86-1990 333264. 60 296518, 80 258936. 60 
1991-1995 433343. 20 368664. 50 307723. 80 
1996-20 0 0 527473. 90 437023, 40 352 699. 00 
^All amounts expressed in millions of 1978 dollars. 
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Table 26. Capital flow projections under restrictive 
credit ceilings, 1980-2000^ 
—— 
ALTERNATIVE 
———— 
YEAR BASE $14000 $10000 
REAL ESTATE CAPITAL FLOW 
1980-1981 13338.22 13339.12 13339, 12 
1982-1983 13878.34 13884.47 13394. 61 
1984-1985 14318.84 14347.02 14387. 80 
1986-1990 15074.02 15195.24 15310. 65 
1991-1995 16274.47 16590.88 16862. 93 
1996-2000 17673.85 18168.77 18581. 55 
NET CHANGE IN FINANCIAL ASSET S 
1980-1981 -614.52 -615.22 -615. 22 
1982-1583 -522.77 -568.31 -674. 50 
1984-1985 -259.73 -430.22 -691 . 58 
1986-1990 -986.29 -2210.55 -3381. 77 
1991-1995 -1295.69 -2529.45 -1554. 35 
1996-2000 -2638.97 -487.44 0. 00 
BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS CAPITAL FLOW 
1980-1981 5460.79 5461.50 5462. 38 
1982-1983 5537.67 5550.21 5573. 61 
1984-1985 5574.88 5621.21 5690. 29 
1986-1990 5641.15 5778.77 59 1 0. 54 
1991-1995 5844.04 6101 .58 6336. 56 
1996-2000 6 129.10 6460.62 6699. 27 
MACHINERY CAPITAL FLOW: PURCHASES + DEP. 
1980-1981 16039.49 I 5367.95 13294. 13 
1982-1983 16014.58 14522.20 11789. 05 
19 84-1985 16 186.66 14115.93 12615. 84 
1986-1990 16224.14 14414.91 13657. 50 
1991-1995 16285.89 16365.26 15998. 68 
1996-2000 16581.95 16999.15 16715. 93 
NET CHANGE IN STORED CROP INVENTORIES 
1980-1981 396.90 397.18 397. 18 
1982-1983 -48.41 -121.12 -256. 27 
1984-1985 141.22 38.51 -52. 44 
1986-1990 209.92 1 19.51 96. 60 
1991-1995 113.52 140.97 234. 55 
1996-2000 59.93 24.45 -413. 71 
NET CHANGE IN LIVESTOCK INVENTORIES 
1980-1981 1150.85 1150.85 1 1 50. 85 
1982-1983 531.75 501.12 440. 50 
1984-1985 329.50 271.89 211. 24 
1986-1990 330.09 309.51 338. 14 
1991-1995 351.64 461.02 602. 34 
1996-2000 336.75 449.87 497. 49 
^All amounts expressed in millions of 1978 dollars. 
Ill 
This means that total capital flow is less under either restriction 
than the base level (Figure 22 and Table 25). 
The income effect comprises the rise in commodity prices and 
net income which results from the restriction in supply. By 1992 
this income effect is strong enough to increase total capital flow 
above base levels. In spite of the rationed credit, total capital 
flow is approximately 5 percent higher for both restrictions than 
the base average for 1996-2000 (Table 25). The fact that machinery 
capital flow is slightly above the base average in 1996-2000 testifies 
to the strength of the income effect (Table 26). Real estate capital 
flow steadily rises above base levels as rising net income boosts 
land prices (Table 26)• Real land prices increase approximately 3 
percent over base in 1996-2000 with a $14 billion credit restriction. 
The $10 billion ceiling raises base land prices 5 percent above the 
1996-2000 average. This analysis assumes that mortgage rates do not 
increase — which may not necessarily be true in a credit rationing 
situation. 
The farm sector turns to increased internal financing as net 
income rises and annual increases in debt are restricted. The share 
of total capital flow financed internally in 1996-2000 rises from 
0.54 in the base to 0.68 with the $14 billion ceiling and 0.80 under 
the $10 billion restriction (Table 27). Total outstanding debt rises 
to $450 billion and $360 billion with credit ceilings (Figure 23). 
The D/A ratio still rises with credit restrictions, but to a lower 
level than in the base projection. The $14 billion celling results 
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Figure 22. Projected total capital flow under restrictive credit 
ceilings, 1980-2000 
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Table 27. Financial analytical ratios under restrictive credit 
ceilings 
1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1991- 1996-
1981 1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Base 
(1) Internal financing ,50 .46 . 4 9  .54 
Total capital flow 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow .46 .47 .50 .54 .51 .46 
(3) Outstanding debt ^9 .33 .38 .54 .60 
Physical assets .70 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
Outstanding debt 10.5 8.6 8.1 6,9 5.0 3.8 
Outstanding debt 5 . 6 0  6 . 7 3  8 . 2 3  1 2 . 6 5  1 3 . 4 5  1 4 . 3 8  
Annual net income 
$14 Billion ceiling 
(1) Internal financing 
Total capital flow 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow 
(3) Outstanding debt 
Physical assets 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 
Outstanding debt 
(5) Outstanding debt 
Annual net income 
.55 .58 .58 
.45 .42 .42 
.29 .32 .36 
1.3 1.0 0.9 
10.0 7.5 6.5 
5.00 6.04 6.84 
.60 .63 .68 
.40 .37 .32 
.45 .52 .58 
1.0 1.3 1.2 
5.3 4.3 3.3 
8.38 9.39 10.38 
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Table 27. Continued 
1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1991- 1996-
1981 1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 
$10 Billion ceiling 
(1) Internal financing 
Total capital flow 
(2) Increase in debt 
Total capital flow 
(3) Outstanding debt 
Physical assets 
(4) Average annual growth 
rate for: 
Physical assets 
Outstanding debt 
(5) Outstanding debt 
Annual net Income 
.59 .67 .68 
.41 .33 .32 
.28 .31 .33 
1.2 0.9 1.0 
8.7 5.5 5.0 
5.25 6.28 6.64 
.71 .76 .80 
.29 .24 .20 
.39 .43 .46 
1.2 1.4 1.5 
4.2 3.3 2.6 
7.48 7.69 8.38 
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Figure 23. Projected total outstanding debt under restrictive credit 
ceilings, 1950-1980 
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in a 1996-2000 average D/A ratio of 0.58, while the $10 billion limit 
brings this ratio down to 0.46 (Table 27). From 1980-1981 to 1996-
2000, the D/I ratio climbs from 5.00 to 10.38 with the $14 billion 
ceiling (Table 27). This likely represents too high a level. As 
discussed earlier, this point will probably not be reached before 
credit demands are brought in line with income flows. 
The $10 billion celling produces an average 1996-2000 D/I ratio 
of 8.38. This is 40 percent below the base level. While the 8.38 
value may again be too high to allow manageable debt servicing, this 
result may point to a significant policy implication. If U.S. 
agriculture persists in expanding debt and stretches the limit of 
income flows to service that debt, then credit rationing may be one 
policy tool to resolve the conflict. Such a policy would have the 
advantage of simultaneously increasing net income and decreasing the 
growth in total outstanding debt. This policy would also integrate 
well with a general economic policy of curbing money supply growth 
and inflation. Credit rationing could be disadvantageous to individual 
groups of farmers — particularly beginning farmers. These farmers 
are highly leveraged to begin with and in tight money conditions face 
a stiffer challenge in servicing their debt. 
In sum, credit rationing benefits U.S. agriculture. Restrictive 
ceilings on debt reduce total capital flow through a "ration" effect 
upon machinery purchases. Declining yields increase farm prices and 
result in higher net farm income. The capital financing burden 
shifts away from debt and toward internal funds. A strong income 
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effect finally results in total capital flows higher than the base 
projection. 
Alternative Inflation Rates 
The finance sector and the CARD model are structured in real 
terms. Inflation does not influence real capital flows, because 
inflationary expectations do not appear as explanatory variables in 
capital demand equations. The purpose of this brief section is to 
provide estimates of capital flows in nominal terms and how these 
values will change under alternative rates of inflation. The model 
was run under inflation rates of 4.00, 5.75 (base), 10.00, and 12.00 
percent. Real dollar quantities were expressed in nominal terms by 
multiplying them by the appropriate consumer price index. Because 
of slight inaccuracies in readjusting the numerous cost and price 
indices in the model, slight adjustments in real production and 
income occur. Thus, analytical ratios may not be identical to the 
base under the alternative rates of inflation. This is due to minor 
readjustments in relative prices caused by inflating the various 
model indices and not because of impacts of inflation upon real 
production levels. 
Table 28 lists total capital flow, financing, net income, and 
total debt for the farm sector with the three alternative inflation 
rates. The base inflation rate results in a tripling of nominal 
values from the 1980-1981 to the 1996-2000 average. The 10 percent 
rate causes a quadrupling in nominal values over this same period, 
while the 12 percent rate creates a six-fold increase. The base 
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Table 28. Capital, credit, and income projections under 
alternative inflation rates, 1980-2000^ 
ALTERNATIVE 
YEAR BASE 4% ÎÔX Ï2% 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
TOTAL 
41165.84 
45577.16 
52267.19 
65644.50 
89428.13 
123639.10 
CAPITAL FLOW 
40755.88 
43669.44 
48463.75 
57364.25 
71927.06 
92083.63 
42160.06 
50439.16 
62495.59 
90462.69 
149889.80 
251935.10 
426 16.44 
52831.78 
67823.13 
104859.60 
190025.80 
349367.70 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
IN 
22088.59 
24349.44 
26056.87 
30246.61 
43722.64 
66485.50 
AL FUNDS 
22213.38 
23761.74 
24659.23 
27113.25 
36216.76 
50739.35 
21805.95 
25795.91 
29674.22 
39144.17 
68090.69 
125551.50 
217 12.08 
26533.99 
31552.38 
44165.9 I  
83628.44 
163399.30 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
INCI 
19077.25 
21227.72 
262 10.34 
35397.90 
45705.52 
57153.57 
E IN DEBT 
18542.51 
19907.71 
23804.54 
30250.98 
35710.3 1 
41343.72 
20354.12 
246 43.  24 
32821.41 
51318.52 
81799.  13 
126433.60 
20904.38 
26297.79 
36270.78 
60693.70 
106397.30 
180968.30 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
U.S.NET 
36210.81 
39917.09 
42716.16 
49584.63 
71676.44 
108992.70 
FARM INCOME 
36415.38 
38953.66 
40424.94 
44447.96 
59371.76 
83180.13 
35747.44 
42288.38 
48646.25 
64170.81 
1 1 1624.00 
205822.30 
35393.56 
43498.34 
51725.22 
72403.13 
137095.80 
276064.50 
1980-1981 
1982-1983 
1984-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
TOTAL OUTSTANDING FARM DEBT 
203121.80 
268973.40 
351885.20 
553885.50 
965721.10 
1569271.00 
200459.20 
256064.80 
3233 33.20 
477277.50 
7634 04.10 
1 138647.00 
209518.00 
302012.  10 
4294 79.00 
788182.70 
1684160.00 
3354835.00 
212428.40 
318197.I  0 
469950.60 
925678.30 
2169637.00 
4741280.00 
All amounts expressed in millions of current dollars. 
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produces nominal averages in 1996-2000 of $123.6 billion in total 
capital flow, $109.0 billion in net farr income, an annual credit 
requirement of $57.2 billion, and total outstanding debt of $1.6 
trillion. The 12 percent inflation rate yields much larger dollar 
amounts in 1996-2000; $349.4 billion in total capital flow, $276.1 
billion in net farm income, annual credit requirements of $181,0 
billion, and average total outstanding debt of $4.7 trillion. 
Melichar (17) reported that higher rates of inflation actually 
reduce the farm sector D/A ratio. His model Implies that farm sector 
physical assets — and more particularly farmland — rise in value at 
a faster rate than inflation. Total outstanding debt, on the other 
hand, is assumed to increase only at the same rate as inflation. 
Thus, as the inflation rate goes up, the D/A ratio declines. 
Land price equations in this study are estimated in real terms. 
The consumer price index was not significant in explaining variation 
in real land prices. Thus, the actual inflation rate does not 
influence the real price of farmland. This is not consistent with 
Melichar's results and may be a weakness in the model. 
The real value of farm sector real estate in the 1970s lends 
credence to Melichar's results. Inflation increased from an annual 
rate of about 4 percent in 1970 to roughly 12 percent in 1980. 
.Over this same period, the constant dollar value of real estate 
increased 54 percent (Table 29). 
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Table 29. Value of real estate held by the farm sector, 1970-1980^ 
Year Value^ 
(millions of dollars) 
1970 190,453 
1971 187,232 
1972 194,492 
1973 209,345 
1974 234,610 
1975 236,038 
1977 276,010 
1978 280,887 
1979 292,886 
1980 300,000 
^Source; (20). 
^1967 dollars. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A finance sector incorporated in a sequential econometric simula­
tion model has provided capital flow projections for the U.S. farm 
sector over the period, 1980-2000. This model formulation has 
permitted the analysis of production impacts upon capital flows as 
well as the effect of financial conditions upon agricultural produc­
tion. Many of the alternative projections suggest an intense future 
conflict between the expansion of farm sector debt and the income 
stream in U.S. agriculture. Rising D/A and D/I ratios foretell a 
more highly leveraged financial position for U.S. agriculture. 
Summary of Projections 
Table 30 provides a comparison of average capital flow projections 
over 1996-2000 for the alternative projection scenarios. The base 
alternative projects annual total capital flow of $40.2 billion. 
Sixty-one percent of the annual net income of $35.4 billion is 
committed to capital financing — requiring $18.6 billion in credit 
to finance total capital flow. Total outstanding debt grows to an 
average level of $527.5 billion in 1996-2000. 
Projections are fairly sensitive to the exogenously determined 
export levels. A decrease in the trend level of exports by one-half 
results in farm sector net losses by 1996-2000. Total capital flow 
decreases only slightly and the loss of internal financing forces 
near total reliance upon external sources for capital expansion. 
Total outstanding debt swells to $733.2 billion because of this. 
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Table 30. Comparison of capital flow projections, 1996--2000 average^ 
Total 
capital 
flow 
Net 
farm 
income 
Increase 
in 
debt 
Total 
outstanding 
debt 
(millions of dollars) 
Base 40,209 35,374 18,631 527,474 
0.5 Export trend 36,927 -8,460 36,927 733,181 
1.5 Export trend 45,789 85,359 0 314,292 
75% Price supports 47,076 77,638 235 270,683 
90% Price supports 49,761 93,280 0 198,743 
Alternative I 
energy prices 40,222 41,523 25,329 497,168 
Alternative II 
energy prices 40,245 53,591 7,554 431,712 
$14 Billion 
debt ceiling 42,103 47,084 13,381 437,023 
$10 Billion 
debt ceiling 42,081 54,910 8,585 352,699 
^Amounts in 1978 dollars. 
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This scenario projects rapidly rising D/A and D/l ratios and illustrates 
the developing conflict between debt expansion and income flows. 
Exports set at a trend rate 1.5 times the base level result in 
20 percent higher total capital flow and a doubling of net income 
over base projections. The increased availability of internal 
financing allows annual debt expansion to fall to zero. Total out­
standing debt only rises to $314.3 billion — less than half the 0.5 
trend export level. 
Price supports offer Immediate boosts in income and raise capital 
flow demands more than any other alternatives. Net farm income 
rises to $77.6 billion and $93.3 billion under the 75 percent and 90 
percent of parity price supports. High net incomes allow debt 
financing to decline sharply. As a result, total outstanding debt 
stands at only $270.7 and 198.7 billion with the two respective price 
support programs. 
Rising energy prices end up benefiting American farmers. Net 
income rises dramatically as increasing energy costs restrict the 
supply of agricultural commodities, while demand grows and remains 
inelastic. Rising price trends for diesel fuel at two and four times 
the base rate project net farm income of $41.5 billion and $53.6 
billion. Total capital flow remains constant with rising energy 
prices due to the combination of falling machinery purchases (substitu­
tion effect) and rising real estate capital flow (income effect). 
Increased amounts of internal financing allow credit demands to 
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diminish. Total outstanding debt climbs to $497.2 billion and $431.7 
billion under the two rising energy price trends. 
Tight monetary conditions are simulated by placing restrictive 
ceilings on the farm sector credit supply. Ceilings lower the stock 
of capital machinery inputs, reduce yields, and thereby restrain the 
supply of agricultural commodities. Consequently, net farm income 
rises to $47.1 billion with a 70 percent debt ceiling and $54.9 
billion under a 50 percent restriction on credit. Total capital 
flow increases slightly as real estate capital flows increase (income 
effect) more than machinery purchases decline (substitution or 
"ration" effect). Rising net farm income and restrictions on debt 
produce greater dependence upon internal sources for capital financing. 
Total outstanding debt grows to $437.0 billion and $352.7 billion — 
both amounts well below the base value. 
Financial and Policy Implications 
These projections suggest several important implications con­
cerning the financial position of U.S. agriculture and farm policies 
in the future. The most striking result in this study is a sharp 
projected increase in financial leverage in the farm sector. While 
this projection is made with certain limitations, a farm sector which 
moves toward the degree of leverage implicit in these projections 
will undergo some major changes. 
First, U.S. agriculture will feel the effects of the business 
cycle as well as monetary policy much more acutely than heretofore. 
A greater proportion of capital will flow from the nonagricultural 
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sector. Consequently, interest rate movements will exact much 
greater impact upon farm sector production and income than has been 
the case in the past. Agricultural credit markets traditionally 
have been very stable — with little variation in interest rates, 
especially long-term interest rates. This has been changing in the 
1970s. If the projections of this study are correct, farm sector 
credit markets give all indications of continuing this trend toward 
increased volatility. As national interest rates go, so will go the 
farm sector. The strong, insulating layer of internal financing 
will no longer exist to protect agriculture from the variability 
present in other credit markets. 
Aggregate analysis often masks substantial differences in impact 
among farms of different sizes. The increased volatility in farm 
credit markets will inject an additional element of risk for farm 
borrowers. Large farmers, to the extent they can better accept 
risk, will be able to manage new borrowings with greater ease than 
small farmers. As interest rates rise, farmers who have stretched 
debt capacity to the limits of their income stream will be price-
rationed out of the credit market and may face business failure. 
Secondly, U.S. agriculture will find itself increasingly in 
competition with other industries for credit in national money 
markets. Agriculture has enjoyed a rather special position in the 
past. Because a high proportion of capital has come from Internal 
sources, agriculture has been able to invest capital at a rate largely 
determined by demand alone. With a larger portion of capital funds 
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flowing through national money markets, the supply of credit will 
play a much more dominant role in the rate of farm sector capital 
expansion. 
The supply of farm credit with stable terms may become an 
important element of future U.S. farm policy for the above reasons. 
Farmers who face increased variability in income because of interest 
rate fluctuations may put pressure on legislators to make more 
government farm credit available. The government could supply 
increased amounts of credit with terms more stable than the non-
agricultural private sector. Such a policy would have the effect 
of stabilizing the financial position of farmers. Government 
extension of farm credit can effect major influences on farm 
structure. In the past, farm credit policy has tended to encourage 
larger farms by tying credit extensions to equity base (10). As 
noted above, small farmers face higher risk in volatile credit 
markets than large farmers. If farm policy wishes to supply credit 
in such a manner so as not to discriminate according to farm size, 
then smaller farms may require more favorable terms than larger 
farms. Finally, to the extent that increasing financial leverage 
makes the food supply more subject to variations in money market 
conditions, a farm policy which makes increased amounts of farm 
credit available can be viewed as stabilizing farm production and 
prices. 
This study has mentioned at several junctures that the expan­
sion of farm debt may create an intense conflict with an income 
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stream that may be increasing less rapidly. This conflict will 
precipitate corrective measures in the farm sector to realign debt 
levels with income. Clearly, U.S. agriculture can support only so 
much debt before collapsing under the burden of unmanageable debt 
service requirements. There are several possible corrective measures 
which might occur. 
The farm sector may reduce its capital flow demands in the face 
of either self-imposed or market-imposed restrictions on the supply 
of credit. Given that the model projects only a modest expansion in 
the capital stock, this seems unlikely. Recall that even the 
pessimistic export alternative as well as the credit ceiling alterna­
tives witnessed only modest reductions in total capital flow. This 
suggests that capital demands remain strong even as the debt load 
increases. Melichar (17) suggests that one portion of capital demand 
which may decrease in the future is real estate capital flow. He 
reasons that less capital will be transferred out of the farm sector 
by discontinuing proprietors because farmland will be carrying a 
higher percentage of mortgage debt. Thus, less equity capital exists 
to be withdrawn. 
Adjustments in the farm sector savings ratio is another correc­
tive measure which may be used to realign debt with income. A major 
weakness of this study is the simplistic handling of the savings 
ratio. A natural response to a rising D/I ratio and the resulting 
higher burden of debt service on income is to increase the rate of 
saving. The model does not reflect this. The extent to which the 
128 
farm sector can reduce consumption and extend internal financing may 
largely determine how any future conflict will be resolved. The 
model does not contain a consumption function. Inclusion of this 
and a structurally determined savings rate would add considerable 
refinement to model analysis. 
Melichar (17) suggests that farm sector capital expansion 
requires considerable debt financing not because farm income is 
consumed at a high rate but rather because of sharp increases in 
capital requirements brought about by larger farms. The optimum 
farm size in America represents more capital to be financed than the 
typical farmer can hope to accumulate in his lifetime. Melichar 
points out that when this point has been reached in other U.S. 
industries, "ownership and management have generally been separated 
through takeover by publically-held firms" (17, p. 324). The American 
farmer has responded to larger farms by increasing his debt load. 
If the capital necessary to finance an optimum size farm grows to 
the point where it exceeds the debt-carrying capacity of an individual 
farmer, then Incentives will exist for nonagricultural equity to 
enter the farm sector. In other words, one response of farmers who 
have already stretched the debt-carrying capacity of their income 
stream to the limit may be to offer equity shares to the nonagri­
cultural sector in exchange for capital. 
Increased equity participation by the nonagricultural sector 
can thus be seen as a possible outcome of the debt — income 
conflict. This outcome depends upon the demands for capital brought 
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about by increasing farm size. Viewed in these terms, Melichar 
concludes that the trend in farm debt expansion "should reflect farm 
enlargement possibilities and pressures" (17, p. 325). Increasing 
equity participation by the nonagricultural sector would carry 
far-reaching implications for the structure of U.S. farms. A 
"corporate" approach to ownership would tend to replace family 
proprietorship. While many family farms in the U.S. are currently 
incorporated, this is largely the result of tax incentives and 
intergenerational transfer considerations. This possible outcome 
suggests the need for equity financing as the motivator for increasing 
corporate ownership. 
The restrictive debt ceiling simulations furnish an unlikely 
policy candidate for possible resolution of the conflict between farm 
debt and income — restrictive monetary policy. Results indicate 
that credit rationing causes a decline in the supply of agricultural 
commodities and ultimately increases net farm income. Thus, we see 
a paradox in farm policy. While farm groups lobby for an increasing 
role for the government in extending stable, subsidized credit, 
farmers may actually be better off if the government rations credit 
to the farm sector. Comparison of the financial leverage which 
results under alternative credit restrictions indicates that rather 
severe debt ceilings would be necessary to bring debt into reasonable 
alignment with income. One serious disadvantage of a credit ration­
ing policy is that it might discriminate against beginning farmers. 
With tight monetary conditions, farmers with the best equity positions 
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are best able to acquire available credit. Thus, special provisions 
might be necessary to insure credit availability to low equity, 
beginning farmers. Credit rationing is not likely to receive serious 
consideration as a policy instrument for reducing farm debt strain 
because it would be very unpopular politically. 
Limitations and Suggestions 
for Further Research 
The projections contained in this study are not made without 
limitations. The simplistic handling of the savings ratio and 
exports are two principal limitations. The model could benefit from 
linkages with a nonagricultural sector and a model of farm credit 
supply. These limitations are each given brief consideration below. 
(1) The savings ratio will be crucial to future farm debt 
expansion. The model contains a constant, exogenously 
set savings rate. Analysis would be strengthened 
considerably if this rate could be determined endogenously. 
Research attention needs to be paid to what parameters 
influence the savings rate and how this rate will respond 
to increasing financial leverage. 
(2) Exports have been shown to exert tremendous influence on 
farm income. The model allows for only a simple exogenous 
trend in exports. An endogenous treatment of exports would 
extend the analysis and allow a closer examination of 
how international factors affect farm sector capital and 
credit demands. 
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The restrictive credit alternatives reveal that important 
results can be demonstrated by examining general economic 
impacts upon the farm sector. Linkage of the CARD model 
with a nonagricultural sector would enable more complete 
analysis of the impacts of economic policy between sectors. 
An important dimension in the capital expansion of U.S. 
agriculture in the future is how well it can compete with 
other industries for credit in national money markets. 
Linkage with a nonagricultural sector would allow one to 
address this issue. 
This study has largely ignored farm credit supply considera­
tions . Model formulation subsumes the cost and availability 
of credit into the determination of the savings rate. 
Melichar finds this attractive in that "it keeps one keenly 
aware that the factors affecting the quantity or proportion 
of internal financing are necessarily also the factors 
affecting its mirror image, the quantity of external 
financing" (17, p. 323). This demand orientation may be 
justified somewhat in that capital expansion has historically 
been largely demand determined. However, this is changing 
as U.S. agriculture must increasingly find credit in 
national money markets. Analysis could be extended 
considerably, therefore, by linking the CARD model with 
a model of agricultural credit supply such as the one 
developed by Lins ( 15) . 
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Conclusions 
Capital will continue to play a crucial role as U.S. agriculture 
develops over the next two decades. Farms will likely continue to 
grow in size. New technology will open new vistas of farming tech­
niques and machines. The average U.S. farmer in the year 2000 may 
control amounts of capital that seemed unheard of by his 1980 counter­
part if current trends continue. The farmer of the future may well 
be financially leveraged to an extent unknown today in order to 
control this amount of capital. The future farmer could become some­
what of a plant manager if rising capital requirements exceed his 
capacity to carry debt and lead to corporate farm ownership. 
Capital and credit demands may be projected now with computer 
models. But energy prices, technology, exports, inflation, political 
conditions, these and a host of other variables will be the players 
that actually determine capital and credit demands in U.S. agriculture 
over the next two decades. 
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